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Curatorial Artefact:  A Body of Work consisting of extracts from six published 
novels: Julia Paradise (1986); Prince of the Lilies (1991); Billy Sunday (1995); 
Nightpictures (1997); Swan Bay (2003); The Mothers (2015) 
 
 
Abstract for Exegesis 
 
In this exegesis, I outline some methodological problems that arise when an 
artist retrospectively attempts to analyse his own novels. I reflect in a personal 
way on the importance of respecting that which must remain essentially 
mysterious in art. Ultimately, we are unable to state anything at all about the 
process of writing a novel except by what Lacan called ‘half-saying’. In all my 
novels, I have been interested in exploring the unconscious as tension or 
ambiguity in the narrative. I probe how the unconscious might have operated in 
my own life as the engine of fiction. I examine the complexities of voice in 
literary fiction as a way of trying to understand the tension between hysterical 
impulses of character and the concealing mechanisms of structure in the 
dialectics of the novel. I conclude that the experience of writing a novel is not 
reproducible, and I explore the implications of these limits for the pedagogy of 
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Chapter One: Introduction 




IN THE EARLY PART of 1990, aged thirty-seven, I travelled with my family to British 
Columbia, Canada, where I took up an appointment as visiting professor in the Creative 
Writing department of the University of Victoria on Vancouver Island. At the time, I 
was working on revisions of the manuscript of my second novel, Prince of the Lilies 
(1991), set in Greece. I had been approached by Lynn Nesbit, of Janklow and Nesbit in 
New York (agent for Tom Wolfe, Joan Didion et al.), offering to represent me 
throughout the world. The draft manuscript was being read by my publishers—Hilary 
McPhee of McPhee Gribble, Australia, Tom Maschler of Jonathan Cape, UK, and Jim 
Silberman of Summit Books (Simon and Schuster), USA. 
The following are two journal entries from this period, chosen more or less at 
random:  
 
Tuesday 13 February, 1990      
Lynn Nesbit calls this morning to say Tom and Jim (I know they've spoken over 
the phone together, forming a common front) don't like my novel. They'll publish, but 




to hold off on a contract until I've finished the fairly radical rewrite I began on the 
weekend.  
I'm trying something very different. (I've still got a copy of the old version on 
computer disk.) If they don't understand it, or think there's ‘no story’—well, I must be 
doing something wrong. Trying to be too subtle and elaborate for my own good.  
I know that. But the thing that worries me is that Hilary likes it pretty much the 
way it is. (Or is it a good thing for me to be alone over here for a few months, away 
from her influence?) 
Anyway, my first reaction was anger. If they don't understand it, I'll give them a 
‘children's version’—simple, chronological, ‘characters’ and ‘story’. I even thought—a 
joke—I'd publish two versions: the complex ‘Grid Trenches’ version for Australia, and 
the ‘children's version’ abroad.  
Still, the name of the game is not making concessions to the reader, but seducing 
and compelling the reader. I can still do that without watering down the ideas and 
metaphysics, I think.  
 
Monday 12 March, 1990 
Last night in the bath I was thinking: good writing makes good reading because 
the writer is doing things the reader can't see. But when these connections are made in 
the reader's mind, there are spurts of pleasure ... intensely pleasurable leaps of 
understanding, which are echoes of the author's own spurts of inspiration in process of 
composition. For example, in Julia Paradise, the problematics are subtly set, but not 
explained, in Part One (Ayres' sexual nature). Part Two, of course, is 'dream factors'. 




problematics of Ayres' sexuality and the girl's death. In other words, the 'vision' is well 
behind the surface of the fiction, shaping it: the reader must work to grasp the vision...  
 
We can see from this that, although the primary source here is authentic, and 
although it would seem a promising vein to open in order to bleed out the self in an 
attempted auto-ethnography, the extracts are already beginning to shape how one might 
think about my work. The selection is already suggesting an order in place of none. 
Selected Works, such as the curated artefact of the PhD by Prior Publications, 
which I have assembled in this thesis, have a similar weakness. There is a kind of 
circularity: the selection inevitably forges connections across novels and determines 
themes and interpretations, though in this case the act of selecting is itself also shaped 
by implied thematic assumptions. The retrospective is not the same as the catalogue 
raisonné; the selection necessary for a retrospective follows a pattern, or a thread. I 
chose as the epigraph for my first novel a line of Flaubert: ‘Stupidity consists of 
wanting to reach conclusions. We are a thread, and we want to know the whole cloth.’ 
(Flaubert & Steegmuller 1980, p. 127) The retrospective selection of extracts from my 
novels for this PhD thesis ties together some ‘threads’, but it would be a mistake to 
think that together those threads made up the ‘whole cloth’.  
In all my work I have been interested in interrogating ideas of the unconscious 
as tension or ambiguity in the narrative, which is to say that I have been interested in 
avoiding naïve conclusions about the truth of human experience. Experiences are 
doubly inscribed into language and into affects outside the linguistic frame of conscious 
thought. How should fiction take into account ‘the truth of the mind’? My novels 
attempt to bring those limits and ambiguities into narrative focus. The reader is never 




untangled. Is creativity, too, a sinthôme, a knot which should not be untangled? It is a 
question I will return to repeatedly in this exegesis. 
Is it possible to find in the lived experience of the writer something to account 
for the susceptibility to a particular recurring image or set of images? Why, for 
example, does my fiction appear so often to concern itself with sex and pregnancy? Can 
such a question be answered categorically? How reliably can we access our own 
unconscious intentions? And how can the artist's unconscious be adequately explained 
retrospectively?  
The retrospective endorses a spurious view of the artist's destiny. Herakleitos's 
idea that ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (character is destiny, Fragment 119) does not suggest 
absolute free-will but, rather, the idea that destiny is a powerful irrational force located 
deep within the mind. A psychoanalyst might define it as that portion of our desire 
which we are unable to think about in words. We 'think about' it—experience it—in 
other ways: in the body, in dreams, in spontaneous associations in creativity and art, in 
the uncanny. But it is a condition of destiny that it be blind.  
An artist's understanding of his own practice and his feelings towards his own 
body of work are not straightforward or fixed. Nor can they be adequately explained 
through critical discourse. To suggest that this knowledge belongs to the domain of 
those things which cannot be spoken, or at best only half spoken, is not to try 
unnecessarily to mystify the creative process, or to indulge what one Australian 
academic has recently called 'the tall-poppied, charismatic secret-specialised self' 
(Gibson 2018). On the contrary, it is to concede the necessary limits of critical discourse 
in dealing with these questions.   
It might be generally understood in psychoanalytic approaches that some 




might be seen in recurring themes and situations, character types, terms of conflicts, 
even narrative shapes, or a particular register of language that seems to match a certain 
psychic state. When it comes to the author, evidence might be found in the direction 
solitude takes (destination pleasure or pain). And if we look at characters, we might 
point to a sense of inevitability about the route along which characters unfold. 
But this approach will always lead to reductive explanations and is dangerously 
simplistic in that it suggests a ‘key’ that might ‘cure’ the subject-who-writes and 
thereby effectively attack the integrity or authenticity of a work of art. Art deserves the 
right to maintain its autonomy and mystique. 
Of course, it would be impossible for one's practice of fiction to take place 
outside ideas (for that would be somehow to write 'outside language'), but I do think it 
important for the writer of fiction to imagine as one pleases in order to achieve aesthetic 
ends, not consciously to harness one's practice to conform to political or ideological 
agendas (although it is impossible for any aspect of culture to escape its implications). 
My view is that creative writing should generally be located at the border of the 
discourses of the master and the hysteric, and not within the discourse of the university.  
Attempts to theorise one's own creative work can seem reductive, and this is no 
less the case when it comes to psychoanalytic theory, which can often threaten to reduce 
the work of art to the status of case-study, and even jeopardise one's creative process. 
The artist does not want to be 'cured'. The author, like character in fiction, is always in a 
sense unstable, but importantly, generatively so. Any attempt to theorise creative 
practice should respect the artist's desire to preserve the mysteries of creativity. As 
Sontag argued, such attempts should account for the sensuous texture of the artwork 
without trying to explain it away: 'in place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art'. 




I believe that Lacanian theory provides an ethical position for artists to resist 
codification of the creative process. Lacan, especially in Seminar VII on Antigone and 
the limits of the symbolic, provides an ethical position for artists to resist codification of 
the creative process into the knowledge economy of the university. What Lacanian 
theory provides, instead, is a way of understanding creativity as a process informed by 
desire rather than knowledge, while respecting the inviolable nature of desire. As Kesel 
puts it: 'Why, then, should it be one's ethical duty to go in search of "desire's measure" 
operative in art, religion and science? Why confront these liveable kinds of pleasure 
economies…?' (Kesel 2009, p. 98) 
 
                                                 # 
 
What can be said with any certainty about my novels is that they often have 
historical settings. Julia Paradise (Jones 1986) is set in China in the 1920s and 30s, 
Prince of the Lilies (Jones 1991) is inspired by 20th Century Minoan archaeology, Billy 
Sunday (Jones 1995) is set in the USA in the 1890s, Nightpictures (Jones 1997) evokes 
Venice in the 1980s and Melbourne in the 1960s, Swan Bay (Jones 2003) is set in 
Australia but also engages with Ancient Rome, and The Mothers (Jones 2015) takes 
place in Melbourne from 1917 to 1990. One could also say that the tension between 
world and mind, history and myth, is a key theme in all those novels. It's 
straightforward for the writer to summarise the themes of novels written a considerable 
time ago. The truthfulness or usefulness of such summaries are, however, contested and 
problematic.  
Retrospectives make a body of artworks seem more schematic than they really 




impression of a unity and organic connection between works, making all the books 
written in a lifetime fit together perfectly, making sense of them seen as a whole, 
making it easy for the reader (or the critic) to get a take on your ‘brand.’ The 
retrospective is, of course, partly a marketing strategy, its aim being to make the themes 
and patterns of the artist's work understandable and digestible, through the 
oversimplifications of literary critics and curators. We might live in the age of 'artist 
statements', but it seems absurd to expect the artist to reduce a complex artefact to a 
summary or a piece of advertising copy.  
Another problem with the authenticity of the retrospective is that the critical 
reception and analysis of a novel can have an effect on the author's own understanding 
(or can even change his memory) of the book he has produced. And, as the publication 
date of the novel moves further into the past, the process of mythologising, or self-
mythologising, is increasingly selective, eliding this aspect, emphasising that one. The 
author's understanding of his own novel, his memory of the processes by which it was 
produced, loses its reliability as testimony. With the passing of time, the crossings-out, 
the false leads, the mistakes, fade from sight. I don't mean only in the manuscript, which 
now sits in the manuscript collection of the State Library, awaiting the attention of 
future scholars; the life that was being lived as the context of those successive drafts 
also becomes more foggy, and the author's hopes and anxieties regarding the novel, or 
the impacts of family or personal or financial factors seem to diminish.  
The retrospective is an attempt at a thematic history, and therefore it attempts to 
explain (as history always does). But with artworks, all explanations are imposed. A 
work of art survives its explication. If it is something more than its author's intention, it 
is also something distinct from its reception. Of course, the process of retrospection 




on a context outside the author's control—and to a lesser or greater degree, that context 
must be accommodated, even if through contest or rejection—the dynamics of 
retrospection speed up, and the screen version it tells takes on its own claims as truth.  
What this means is that, while I have selected the work for the curated artefact in 
this PhD thesis, my selection is no more authentic than someone else’s might be. All 
memoirs—and we might understand my curated artefact and, indeed, this exegesis as 
kinds of memoir—are curated. The primary pitfall of memoir, according to Elisa 
Gabbert, is ‘an overeagerness to analyze, and a false finality to the analysis’. (Gabbert 
2018) 
The most successful life-writing achieves a convincing impression of 
truthfulness—yet even the famous 'thick description' of ethnography (Geertz 1973) 
provides only an illusion of authority. It is an attempt to offer cultural context 
(historicity), but structuralism has exposed the hidden elements of culture which 
destabilise the study-group's story or identity. The psychoanalyst, of course, is always 
sceptical of the patient's story. Auto-ethnography—of the kind I attempt in this 
exegesis—negotiates these problems by calling attention to and questioning the 
authority of the writing subject. Even so, its successes will only ever be relative; its 
contextualising of the work of art in the writer's life, the thick description, will only ever 
be a disguise.  
 
                                                    # 
 
Thinking about the retrospective in terms of autobiography is usefully revealing. 
The retrospective is a showing and telling that curates the author's exhibitionist and 




undergone double inscription into screen version/taboo. The artist would be unwise to 
try to elucidate this unconscious source of creativity, even if he or she did have 
psychoanalytic access to it.  Nevertheless, the taboo material is in a sense like the 
criminal who secretly wants to be caught and can't resist leaving clues. Ted Hughes has 
said, in relation to confessional poetry, but in a way that holds true of all art, that what is 
involved ‘is a revealing of something that the writer doesn’t actually want to say but 
desperately needs to communicate, to be delivered of. Perhaps it’s the need to keep it 
hidden that makes it poetic—makes it poetry.’ (Hughes 2008, p. 287) 
Here we come across the source of the artist's anxiety: the tension between the 
hysterical urge to reveal and the paranoid need to conceal. This demonstrates the 
schizoid state, the fractured subject, of the writer. In the same way, the imagination is 
wound back on its own secretiveness. This furtive quality in writing is what gives one 
the energy to compose; if it were done in the full glare of scrutiny the anxiety would be 
paralysing. It also informs one's sceptical defensiveness towards the retrospective.  
This crucial tension between revealing and concealing is also apparent in the 
characters that populate fiction. The characters in a novel are not discrete parcels of ego 
walking through the plot points. Every character is also caught in (and animated by) the 
tension between revealing and concealing. In the novel, it is a sense of secrets to be 
discovered in the lives of the characters that keeps us reading, even as we also want to 
delay the discovery that will terminate the book. These tensions apply equally to the 
writer selecting those passages of his or her work for the Selected or retrospective. 
There are secrets he or she wants to discover—but also defer—when it comes to the 
work.  
In any case, those secrets are not available for discovery through the 




emphasising the themes which might seem the most important and significant, or which 
he or she thinks readers and viewers might find the most important and significant. 
Readers and viewers, in taking the selection at face value, are quite happy to overlook 
the intentional fallacy.  
As Hecq points out, ‘Importantly, existing approaches, ‘with their focus on the 
critical, and often a posteriori, investigation and interpretation of textual content’ 
(Webb & Brien, 2012: 193), do not offer a satisfactory research methodology for 
creative writers’ (Hecq 2015, p. 22). The problem with the retrospective interpretation 
by the artist is that it neither triggers nor informs the work, but imposes on the work a 
posteriori. 
The kind of knowledge that informs the retrospective is in fact irrelevant to the 
composition of the art works; it tells us nothing about how the art works were made. 
During the creative process, the imagination requires a suspension of disbelief on the 
part of the author while the dream work of first drafts is in progress—just as much as on 
the part of the reader who approaches the published work. The retrospective is 
disingenuous in that it gives the impression that the writer's analytics were active during 
(or even before) composition. The retrospective casts an interpretation like a shadow 
over the work which can give an impression that the novels are the product of a schema 
or a template. However, creative work is aleatory and spontaneous. Once the writing 
process becomes too deliberate and predictable—whether through a timid aversion to 
causing offence, or an unwillingness to take aesthetic risks in order not to transgress 
against some orthodoxy or even against the category which critical discourse has 
assigned to the author—anxiety about being able to control the outcome of the creative 
process inevitably limits the spontaneous and ludic aspects of invention. Trying to 




play of composing, which is rebellious and contrarian, irrespective of the individual 
artist's personality.  
The retrospective also fosters a fallacious model of creativity as conception 
followed by execution. Of course, a novel develops in unforeseen ways during the 
process of composition; this is how fiction secretly grows its 'claws and wings', in 
Nabokov's phrase (Nabokov, 2008, p.354). Unforeseen new directions open up during 
composition, as the original conception is outstripped by chance events on the journey. 
The retrospective creates an impression of arresting time even at the moment it purports 
to demonstrate the orderly and inexorable passage and process of work over a long 
period.  
Language is the stool-pigeon of unconscious intention, after the fact, but there is 
a lot more than unconscious intention when it comes to the making of a novel—
something I will attempt to tease out in the following chapters of this exegesis. During 
composition, those unconscious intentions can only be half glimpsed, as imaginative 
connections are made heuristically, like the early archaeologists stumbling upon hidden 
treasure. The intuition about how certain material might be used in a work is always 
fragile and provisional. Certain situations and details have an ominous or numinous 
quality. This mysterious feeling that precedes a fragment of composition cannot be 
reproduced through retrospective analysis—and yet it is the essential experience of the 
artwork. Ironically, the retrospective favours and isolates these charged moments, the 
epiphanies, the moments of success, from the rest of the process, which might be less 
spectacular. Character is the iron bar that ‘must have been bent and seen to be bent’ 
(O'Connor 1985, p. 216). The retrospective, by selecting passages in novels where 
characters undergo some fundamental transformation, suggests through a concatenation 




inevitably creates a pattern, it falsely encourages the comforting assumption that the 
author was always in charge of the process which produced just this pattern.  
However, it is the argument of this exegesis that creative writing is most 
usefully seen as a primitive activity, indefinable but indispensable. Theory cannot 
dispense with primitive notions. Nor can primitive notions be codified logically into 
strings of data. In encouraging this view that they can, the retrospective elides the fact 
that in production these connections were stumbled upon by chance or intuition, given 
that the process was continually mediated by unconscious desire in the author. The 
artwork retains traces of desire that can never be satisfied.  
The retrospective gives the impression of following the work through the chaotic 
circumstances of composition to the clarity of the final draft; the retrospective positions 
itself as 'the final draft of all the final drafts'. It makes the life's work (and the artist’s 
career, the trajectory) unproblematic, favouring notions of 'natural' development of 
works and the 'organic' growth of the artist's sensibility. By focusing on theme, the 
retrospective lays down the orderly path, implies progress from one 'landmark' to the 
next and in so doing smooths out the problematic, the transient, the surprising, the 
unknown—precisely the things I want to highlight in this exegesis. Thus art, through 
the process of the retrospective, is demystified, organised and categorised according to 
the discourse of the master into works that are in danger of functioning simply as 
‘bureaucratic speech acts’ (Boucher 2006, p. 286). As per Foucault’s ‘rationality 
paradox’, whereby ‘every attempt to examine irrationality reveals only the rigorous 
categories of reason’ (Foucault 1989 (1961), p. 107), a retrospective disguises the 
reality of creativity. 
All curators wear beige, in this sense. Curators live in dread of the senseless 




experience. In undertaking a retrospective and exegetical statement about my own 
work—as I have in this thesis—I have risked being complicit in my own symbolic 
castration. I have risked being a collaborator in the university’s colonisation of artistic 
space. This retrospective and this exegesis are very well aware that they run the danger 
of entering Marianne Moore’s imaginary garden without the real toads (Moore 1924). 
However, as this introduction suggests, this thesis aims to engage provocatively and 
authentically with the problematic nature of the master discourses that surround artistic 
practice and creative writing in the contemporary University, through a combination of 





























Every novel is a kind of nervous breakdown.  
I can’t move my body, can’t lift my arms or my head. I just lie on the bed. I 
can’t even move to go to the garage to hang myself.  
It’s the spring of 1999 and these are the effects of my first dose of Arapax (a 
trade name for paroxetine), but I have been in such a deep depression before taking the 
medication that I have spent almost every afternoon lying in bed like this. For weeks 
now, maybe months, I have fantasised the scene: buying the rope from the hardware 
store, slinging it over the rafter in the garage (though I’ll have to be careful, as the 
timber of the rafter is none too strong). Later, Dr S. said these weren’t genuine suicidal 
intentions, but fantasies of escape. 
Escape from what?  
The first time I took Arapax, the effect was dramatic. I don’t know if everyone 
who takes them has these symptoms, or whether it was something peculiar to me. 
Maybe it was because of my intensity, the composition of my brain, that it hit me for 
six. There I lay on the bed for hours, not able to move at all. I tried to lift my arm, but it 




daughter was so frightened that she began to cry. She saw me the way that perhaps she 
will see me whenever it is that my body is truly ready to die.  
So, what had happened to me?  
I had stopped writing. It was during a period in my mid-forties when I realised 
all my novels were about dead babies, lost childhoods. I can’t remember exactly when 
this insight came to me. I think it developed slowly in the dark and arrived in my mind 
in occasional glimpses. As if to realise such a terrible thing all at once would drive a 
person mad.  
I had also begun to feel that I had lost my talent. I had published four novels, 
and in addition I had been working for seven years on another long piece of fiction I had 
called Marriage Novel, a small segment of which grew into the novel ultimately 
published as Swan Bay (2003). Why was it that I couldn’t write that ‘marriage novel’? 
Why was it that draft after draft failed to develop? After all, it was all drawn from life. 
Every line of dialogue came from notebooks and journals. Something was stopping me. 
Was it a technical problem, I wondered? Why was the material, which should have been 
the stuff of the novel par excellence, so recalcitrant? Was it too close to my life for the 
imagination to take flight? 
Dead babies, lost childhoods. I don’t want to explain my novels away by 
stressing these aspects, nor do I want to suggest there are no other themes in my work. I 
just want to register the fact that the novels I had been writing for twenty years were 
dense, complex stories about illness of various kinds and the deaths of children. I had 
never stopped to ask myself where in my own dark, inner story the novels I was writing 
were coming from.  




Until that dark realisation, I had thought that all my fiction had been concerned 
with the unknown life being lived through the characters. (Whether it’s called fate or the 
unconscious, or perhaps both.) The designs of my novels enabled the characters to come 
to realise those unconscious stories being lived through them. My books have been 
about how the character deals with this realisation, how it changes him or her. This is 
true for Ayres in Julia Paradise (1986), for Saracen in Prince of the Lilies (1991), for 
Turner in Billy Sunday (1995), for Sailor in Nightpictures (1997), and for the narrator of 
Swan Bay (2003).  
My novels were written slowly, intuitively, with difficulty. Mine is an aesthetic 
quest, an attempt to arrive at a kind of poetics, according to which the characters and 
their worlds are unified through language. I was often lost. In a way, my narratives 
reflected the obsessive modus of their composition. ‘Compulsion, ambivalence, 
retrospective annulment—the mechanisms of neurosis define just as precisely the laws 
of literary production.’ (Doubrovsky 1986, p. 114) 
This had all worked out well enough for me, and I was a reasonably successful 
writer of literary novels. But now in my forties, I was finding it more difficult to write. I 
had begun to believe I had lost my talent. I became depressed, had thoughts about the 
garage, the rope. I began taking Arapax and lay on the bed, unable to move. I had lost 
something. I felt that I couldn’t write the same kind of novels any more.  
I stopped writing fiction for a time because, when we arrive at a certain age, 
there is no longer the same need to codify experience. The old displacement model no 
longer seems to work. In a sense, my books were the helpless expression of something I 
was unwilling to face up to in life. There is a hidden self who, sooner or later, needs to 
be dealt with, not ‘expressed’ in another novel. Now, the interior story which had been 




invent fiction commensurate with the reality which was being repressed or avoided. One 
had, after all, created imaginative structures through which to say the unsayable. But 
now this invention had become hard work. No, it had become impossible work.  
All of us live with opposite stories running though us all the time, contradictory 
truths, incompatible co-existent fates. And the living and the writing are ways of 
comprehending something of the range of the self. I took Flaubert as my master: ‘I am 
simply a bourgeois living retired in the country, occupying myself with literature.’ But 
perhaps I had taken too literally Flaubert’s dictum Live like a bourgeois, think like a 
god. (Flaubert & Steegmuller 1980, p. 163) I was courageous in my imagination but 
there had always been something puzzling and thwarted in the shy, solitary life I was 
living. When I looked back over the failed manuscript of the novel I had been working 
on, I saw that for seven years I had been trying to write my way out of my marriage—a 
marriage in which I had written all of my published novels up to that time, from Julia 
Paradise (1986) to Nightpictures (1997).  
Fiction comes from the back of the mind, a mental landscape which can only be 
guessed at. That landscape is so dense and elusive that its moods can only be 
apprehended indirectly, captured in apparently random sensations. It cannot be 
completely analysed or finally understood. As Lacan writes, unconscious truth can only 
be ‘half-said’. (Lacan 2007, p. 143) Besides, the unconscious is not innocent or neutral 
territory. It is the terrain of desire, and deny it as we might, writing is always subtly 
directed by the vectors of desire.  
My experience of writing fiction accords with Willem de Kooning’s of painting:  
 
I’m in my element when I’m a little bit out of this world: then I’m in the 




When I’m slipping, I say, “Hey, this is interesting.” It’s when I’m standing 
upright that bothers me . . . As a matter of fact, I’m really slipping most of the 
time. I’m like a slipping glimpser. (Snyder 1995)  
 
This slippage and glimpsing recalls Lacan’s ‘half-saying’ and the techniques of 
analysis, the verbal slips in association, the signifier-chains of desire, that are suggestive 
of truth. As Lacan puts it, ‘We are unable to state anything at all about the relationship 
between knowledge and truth except by half-saying’ and ‘What best incarnates half-
saying is myth.’ (Lacan 2007, pp. 143-4) 
What could it be, I wondered, this mythic landscape inside me that produced 
novels but didn’t want to be told? I had been married for twenty years to a loyal and 
generous woman, I had three nice healthy kids, a house in a beautiful place. What more 
could I want? 




A childhood, a family, inhabit the back of the mind so powerfully. For Freud, 
they are also the root of creativity, because the writer resembles the child at play and 
derives power from the Oedipal drama of the family home. But Freud’s self-confessed 
fear of the ‘state of intellectual bewilderment’ generated by art generates a master 
discourse that denies complexity (Freud 1908).  
What I will say is this: I was a recluse already, even then, even when I was a 
child. It is tempting to believe that there must be something in my frightened, over-




which I inherited my nervous intensity. Surely choosing the vocation of the writer, 
shutting myself off from the world, sitting alone each day in a room living the interior 
life of the imagination, has been an attempt to indefinitely prolong the feeling and 
texture of those lost childhood hours.  
I’m naturally incurious about reality and the practical world. Consciousness for 
me often consists of a deep boredom. But then when an idea comes to me, I become 
completely absorbed in that idea and my brain changes, I feel different, it changes my 
mood completely. It’s the way the prospect of sex completely changes a person’s frame 
of mind. And all the hours when I’m not able to do that, when my imagination is not 
engaged, are a kind of trial, a kind of boredom.  
This boredom, this inability to become involved in life as it is, this always 
wanting more than reality, or something different, or to be someplace else . . . isn’t that 
what we blame Emma Bovary for? This kind of inauthenticity, this lack of courage to 
accept reality or life beyond the desires of the self? Are all novelists guilty of a kind of 
madamebovarisme?  
When it comes to this business of writing, to its source in the experience of my 
childhood, I find that I can garner together the facts. I was born in 1953, grew up in a 
house in Essendon …. But where are the lost feelings? Those feelings that lie at the 
heart of creativity. I can follow the Proustian chain of memory, like anyone else. But 
what guarantee do I have that at the end of all this remembering I will come to my lost 
kingdom of feeling?  
The only way I can find my lost feelings is by inventing them.  





The content is so completely lost, having never been possessed, that its 
reconquest is a creation. And it is precisely because Essence as individuating 
viewpoint surmounts the entire chain of individual association with which it 
breaks . . . Every “explication” of something, in this sense, is the resurrection of 
a self. (Deleuze 2008, p. 78) 
 
If that is true of Proust’s narrator, then it is true of all narrators since. A 
narrator’s voice—his or her ‘Essence’—is somehow above the signifier chains, even as 
it is created by it. No successful narrative voice can avoid the constructs of Essence and 
Logos. In this sense, the novelist is always a metaphysician.  
 
 #
   
I am highly strung. I have a nervous intensity; it’s the way my mind works. 
Taking every little thing into my nerves until they shriek. I can’t help it. I think I was 
probably born like this. It makes me unusual. It might be what people mean when they 
use the term ‘artistic temperament’. What is it? In my experience, it’s a kind of nervous 
irritability. It’s an ability to achieve intense states of concentration, where the scenes in 
the imagination are so vivid that any interruption from the outside world is a kind of 
violation of one’s interior life. That intensity is driven by a kind of anger and aggression   
. . . I am sure that my wife and kids, for many years, must have thought of me as mad. 
For Stephen Diamond, though, the ‘correlation between anger, rage and creativity’ 
(Diamond 1996, p. 259) is essential to art. With it goes a kind of linguistic intensity, 
characterised by feelings of apprehension and emptiness which only the use of words, 




But with the intensity comes a kind of romantic yearning for some other 
impossible order of life, the stable domestic life of Flaubert’s bourgeois writer, which 
can only ever be satisfied in the imagination.   
In my experience, writers are home loving people. We hate to go out to work, to 
go out into the world where events and people send signals which confuse us and infect 
our interior lives. To stay home: this is the central impulse behind why I became a 
writer. The peaceful domestic routine of the daytime house in my childhood—when I 
was often allowed to stay home from school, much like the child character in The 
Mothers (2015)— is something I’ve tried to recapture in being a writer. There is a sense 
in which writers are playing truant all our lives; we’re always staying home pretending 
to be sick.  
I don’t like much novelty in my life. I like to live in the same surroundings each 
day. It’s as though I need to put my nervous apprehension about the external world to 
rest to live internally. I remember the intrusions of the outside world into my safe little 
childhood world as rude shocks. Everyday life, the workaday life of other people, feels 
foreign and dangerous to me.  
I get tired easily. I’m not much of a tourist. A couple of hours of looking at 
things is about all I can take. Usually when I live in Italy or Greece for a while, as I did 
when I was writing Prince of the Lilies (1991) and Nightpictures (1997), I spend most 
of my time inside a room, and I go out into the different culture which exists all around 








My father died in 1969 and shortly afterwards I was told that I was adopted. The 
following year, 1970, saw a big change in me. I’m still trying to understand my 
breakdown when I was seventeen. Whatever it was, it’s something that’s still with me 
now. I also think this was the point at which I decided I wanted to be a writer.  
I remember a few of the details of the breakdown. Staying home from school for 
three or four weeks. Becoming something of a hermit. Cutting myself off from people. 
Firing my toy gun into the phone when Miss Rivers rang me. The feeling of distance 
from ordinary life, as though the reality of other people didn’t really exist. But I don’t 
really recall the quality of that experience. As for its source, I tend to explain this 
breakdown in terms of all the later periods of morbid withdrawal that followed (I can 
name the years), even the lonely life of the writer which I chose for myself, which 
might be considered a kind of permanent morbid withdrawal.  
On those days when I went to school, I was a boy who usually went home for 
lunch; and in many ways, that defined me.  There is something reassuring and seductive 
about being in a darkened room watching TV in the middle of the day. There is 
something in this experience that resists the tyranny of normality, the tyranny of 
daylight, and there is an implicit privileging of the imagination. It is also a retreat into 
darkness and solitude as something comforting. This feeling of isolation and security is 
also what I associate with the ‘retreat’ of reading and writing fiction. Indeed, for Martin 
Amis, ‘the first thing that distinguishes a writer is that he is most alive when alone, most 
fully alive when alone. A tolerance for solitude isn’t anywhere near the full description 
of what really goes on.’ (Amis 2008, p. 355). 
A defining moment of childhood: midday. It’s black and white. The midday 
movie. Boredom is like a blind pulled down in a room. There was, in that room, a 




Insecurity. None of these words seems to say it. I also felt this often in the late 1970s 
when I was teaching in high schools. The loneliness of living in Greece. The solitude I 
found for myself living in Lyon Street, Essendon. This became a whole life of solitude, 
even hermitage, like Flaubert’s Croisset, when I moved to Queenscliff, a small coastal 
town in Victoria. I still feel that solitude and sadness sometimes, part of the cyclical 
pattern of my internal seasons.   
Perhaps this is the lost kingdom of feeling that provides the source of my life as 
a writer? I am not alone in musing thus. Aristotle was perhaps the first to associate 
melancholy with creativity, and melancholy was explicitly embraced as a muse by 
eighteenth-century poets such as William Cowper and Thomas Grey (Baker 2011, p. 
85). Surely dwelling in such a space is masochistic. There is the painful self-doubt that 
comes with writing. Of course, all artists doubt themselves, more sometimes than at 
others. But I think that writers doubt themselves in a fundamental way—perhaps more 
than painters and musicians—because we have no colour or sound to offer, only ideas. 
In a sense, we are never fully living, but holding the key piece of ourselves in reserve, 
always waiting for the idea to arrive. It’s quiet and sad to be always waiting.  
But writing is also more than just masochism, more than just sadness. We must 
remember that story is play, a way of engaging our mind that suspends time. It 
effortlessly absorbs our attention, involves us without trying. It is, above all, an 
involuntary reaction. As Flaubert reminds us, life is a matter of getting erections. ‘Life! 
Life! To have erections! That is everything, the only thing that counts!’ (Flaubert & 
Steegmuller 1980, p. 193) Writing is a matter of getting erections, too. 
The effortless pleasure of fantasy is different from Proust’s ‘involuntary 
memory’(Proust 1983, pp. Vol 3  898-906) but they share a sense of accidental contact 




one might even say an interior sexual story, in each of us. The libidinal economy is 
something more complex and productive than the clichés and stereotypes of 
pornography. And here we see the importance of the solitary and sad space, for that 
hidden story can only be half-glimpsed and half-said in the solitude of a quiet room. 
Under a direct gaze, out in the light of day, it disappears.  
All this has everything to do with the way I came to see writing novels as an 
answer to something unknown to me, to the way I came to ask: what was happening in 
my interior life that sometimes broke its chains and roared out onto the page? These 
were questions that became more pressing but also more frightening by the time I 
reached my 40s and began doubting, in the midst of a deep depression, whether I could 





When I first started writing, of course, I had no idea of such things. In 1976, by 
the age of twenty-three, I was typing out pages of what was, more or less, a first novel. 
Not a very good one. And, I’m happy to say, unpublished. And perhaps the purpose of 
this initial stage of apprenticeship is no more than to prove to oneself that one can write 
a couple of hundred pages of something through discipline and force of will.  
I am not a born novelist. Is anyone a ‘born writer’? Writing a novel is an 
unnatural thing to do. I might have been an academic, except I was too emotional. I 
might have been a journalist, except I was too passionate about ideas. I don’t think, in 




prove myself to the world. As I published novel after novel, it struck me that I was 
earning, over and over, my right to exist.  
By 1985 I had been trying to write the same novel for ten years. I was working 
as a high school teacher in Queenscliff, Victoria. I woke before dawn and spent the 
hours between six and eight sitting at home at my desk, writing and smoking. I had been 
writing about China and reading Freud’s Studies on Hysteria (Freud & Breuer 1955). 
The case histories fascinated me. The studies of Anna, Emmy and the others seemed to 
me as rich as short stories. Breuer’s theoretical work on hypnoid states and the splitting 
of the mind also seemed to nourish the kind of intensely subjective fiction I was trying 
to write. In fact, a new structural idea for my novel occurred to me as a result of reading 
Freud’s work on seduction theory (Freud 1896, pp. 191-221).  A fundamental ambiguity 
in Freudian theory about whether the cases of abuse were memories or fantasies seemed 
to offer me a fine line along which my fiction might sleepwalk. I wondered if, in my 
novel, the ambiguity did not have to be resolved, and the reader might be left to explore 
his or her own reactions to the text? 
Most days what I wrote of the manuscript was banal. Then, for no apparent 
reason, something changed. The mind which speaks the sentences became attuned to a 
mysterious source, elusive yet hypnotic, as if guided by what the Greeks liked to think 
of as the muse. During those moments, it was as if the pen were held by another hand. 
Although the themes were erotic, the experience of writing was not at all erotic. Rather, 
my mind was absorbed in the words and phrases which effortlessly unspooled, and 
which seemed to have the same magisterial distance and power I had admired in 
Flaubert. As Sontag describes it, I was not ‘“saying something”’ but instead ‘allowing 
“something” to have a voice, an independent existence (an existence independent of 




That novel, Julia Paradise, published in 1986, went on to win prizes and was 
published around the world. So now I was a writer. Or was I? Now that I had published 
a first novel, I had to prove myself with the second. Then the third. It’s always the next 
one. And each one of those subsequent books, as F Scott Fitzgerald wrote, had to ‘be a 
consciously artistic achievement + must depend on that as the first books did not’ 
(Fitzgerald 1994, p. 67). 
The experience of writing a novel is not reproducible. Inspiration comes to us 
through grace and luck. The conception and growth of a novel is unpredictable. That’s 
why, even after publishing half a dozen novels, I still always have to begin anew. 




I sometimes told people I crossed a destiny-line in France in 1995. I had been 
invited to be writer-in-residence at the Menzies Centre of the University of London for 
four months. I travelled to Europe with my wife and two youngest children. We had 
decided to travel in France for two months before moving on to London. It was 
summer. We stayed in the country with my translator and friend, Marie-Odile Fortier-
Masek, and her husband, Alan. From there we moved to Paris, where I was trying to sell 
French rights to my newly-published novel Billy Sunday (1995). I called editors at the 
main French publishing houses, requesting meetings. Eventually, I was able to sell 
French rights to Albin Michel. We leased a car and drove around France, staying in the 
south with Jacqueline Bardolph, the postcolonial and Commonwealth literature scholar, 
and her partner Jean Esson, of the University of Nice, at their maison secondaire at Le 




A month after I came home to Australia from Europe, four years before I found 
myself taking Arapax and fantasising about suicide in 1999, I fell in love with a woman. 
She did not love me. She wanted sex and friendship with me, not love. And when she 
realised I was in love with her, she realised the danger and said no to sex too. She just 
wanted to be friends. I kept seeing her for the rest of the year, and I kept suffering. But I 
learned enough from that experience to write a fourth novel, Nightpictures, which was, 
at least in part, a kind of encoded version of that emotional episode.  
I had another breakdown. I felt myself being taken over by a strange power, a 
daemon. He was both inside me, buried deep in my will, but also separate from me, a 
power which seemed to reside in destiny and in the stars and which was acting through 
me. The daemon in me stepped on the accelerator, and I obeyed.  
So, what was it, this psychic change that happened to me that year? Did I change 
as a person, or did I just discover myself, and finally face up to the person I had been all 
along? 
I realised that I needed intimacy with other women. This was a serious matter. 
This wasn’t just ‘the usual’ desire to experiment, driven by the fact that human beings 
are not naturally monogamous (at least in our minds) or  that many people are driven, 
by desires and impulses they don’t understand, into love affairs. That there exists in all 
of us a strong irrational force (or potential force) which we call passion, sexual 
obsession, maybe love . . . Or that, yes, of course everybody likes sex and everybody is 
sometimes attracted to other people, not their partners. Or that most people, if given the 
opportunity, will feel the temptation, and one day succumb to the temptation, to have a 
one night stand, or a holiday fling, or an office romance, or a conference thing.  
No. This mental event was something telling me that I was not the person I had 




It was even worse than that. I realised only now something so dreadful that it 
had been buried away in the unconscious: that I had needs which my wife could never 
satisfy. And that this connected with my rages and all the trouble in our marriage. And 
this need for sexual intimacy—which I would define as something distinct from 
copulation—was connected with my imagination.  
As I have described, I had grown my imaginative life out of the dark compost of 
my childhood and of the bourgeois boredom of an adulthood that repeated that lonely 
state. As Francine Prose suggests, ‘Perhaps what makes unsatisfied desire thrive in the 
jungly climate of the creative psyche is the artist’s insistence on retaining access to the 
emotions and perceptions of childhood’ (Prose 2002, p. 17).  
But now I had changed. Perhaps the artist is a Casanova who has stories instead 
of erotic conquests? Perhaps for all writers Eros is displaced into imagination, the 
creation of life in stories? But this felt different: I knew that my psychological need for 
women was a way of fighting for my life. And that, now, without it, my imagination 
would die. The compost of solitariness had been exhausted of its nutrients for me. Until 
now, the erotic had been unconsciously channelled into art. Only now did the role of the 
Muse—of someone outside the self, who is taken into the self—become consciously 
important to me. So now that life which I had not lived, which in a sense I had stopped 
myself from living, was driving me crazy. I was a ticking time-bomb yearning for my 
own explosion.  
I experienced a psychotic episode. I was sitting near the back fence when I 
began to hear voices, and before long these voices were speaking through me. It was the 
voice of a person I did not know. A while later, I was still sitting near the barbecue, 
speaking in these strange voices, when my wife came outside. I could see she was 




began glowing. I was still aware of this other voice speaking through me. I rose to my 
feet and began to dance. I have no idea where the movements in this dance came from. 
It was like the dance of an island warrior tribe. Perhaps derived from memories of a 
Maori haka. But it was a warrior dance, without doubt. A war dance. And the daemon 
inside me emerged into the world.  
This had been coming for a long time.  
So, who was this daemon inside me? How was he born? How did he come into 
being? Was he part of the same unconscious that had produced powerful narratives in 
my books? For Diamond, the daimonic is indeed intrinsic to creativity, which he 
describes as ‘the child of conflict,’ jeopardised by ‘constant bliss and inner harmony’. 
(Diamond 1996, p. 258) Diamond argues: ‘creativity is the constructive sublimation or 
positive expression of the daimonic’ (Diamond 1996, p. 257). 
In 1996, after my daemonic episode, I began to know myself. I had lived such an 
uptight and repressed life until then. My travels in France, after which I had fallen in 
love and written my erotic novel Nightpictures (1997), were a kind of preparation. (I 
had come to equate France with a certain idea of erotic freedom.) It was hidden in the 
unconscious. My conscious identity was structured around duty, responsibility, a life 
with a good wife, nice kids. This was my sense of myself. And this other self, in the 
unconscious, had been channelled into my writing, giving it power. As Freud puts it, 
‘Dream displacement and dream condensation are the two craftsmen to whom we may 
chiefly attribute the moulding of the dream.’ (Freud 1913, p. 66) 
After I came home from France and London, there was a bomb inside me, 
primed and ready. If it wasn’t one woman it would have been another. My mind 
rearranged itself. It was a mental disintegration. The conscious structure of myself, and 




house. And when you pick up the walls and the rest of the structure and try to put it 
together again, the structure is different. I changed in 1996. Nightpictures, which was 
published in 1997, was a way of expressing that powerful emanation of the daemon. 
The dark and violent power that had produced my early fiction had found its apogee.  
I had changed. I knew who I was. I had published who I was. But I wasn’t yet 
ready to change my life. That change would come only after the breakdown which I 
began writing about at the beginning of this chapter. After 1996, I was stuck in the 
passage between two lives. I did not want to give up being part of my family, give up 
my sense of home. How could I bring myself to break up the family home? Did I have a 
choice? It would be incredibly selfish. It seemed cruel that for me to move forward, I 
had to give up the family I loved. I suppose many other people have confronted this 
exact choice. I stayed.  
In a key sense, I had given up. Perhaps I would never have the woman I needed. 
Perhaps such a mythical woman didn’t exist? Perhaps the rest of my life would pass and 
I would remain lonely in this crucial sense. If this were the case, then I was already 
dead. I could give up on life right now. There was nothing to look forward to. Desire, 
once unearthed, was no longer content to haunt the page.  
I suppressed it for three years. I kept trying to write the ‘marriage novel’ that 
would eventually become Swan Bay (2003). But no matter how hard I tried, nothing I 
wrote seemed to have the power I was used to in my fiction. Because somewhere in my 
interior, I had begun to wither and die, just as the character in my book would 
physically wither and die from her illness.  
My novel stubbornly refused to work. I lost confidence in myself as a writer. No 
matter how hard I tried, I could not get Swan Bay right. Nor could I get any of my other 




revised, constantly restructured, but everything was dead, for I had lost my imagination. 
Looking back, that experience taught me a number of things. For one, it showed me 
how creative writing is not just a matter of technique or handling material—a point I 
will address in more detail in the conclusion to this exegesis in relation to its 
pedagogical ramifications for teaching creative writing. Alice Munro, describing her 
terror at losing the spontaneity and energy of desire, puts it like this:  
 
It isn’t just ideas you need and it isn’t just technique or skill. There’s a 
kind of excitement and faith that I can’t work without. There was a time when I 
never lost that, when it was just inexhaustible. Now I have a little shift 
sometimes when I feel what it would be like to lose it, and I can’t even describe 
what it is (Munro 2007, p. 429).  
 
And, while I don’t like to use that broad and unhelpful general term ‘writer’s 
block’, my ‘block’ suggested the psychic rather than ‘professional’ nature of that 
experience—and how, in addressing such problems, creative-writing teaching needs to 
focus ‘less exclusively on the writing process and products and more on the writing 
subject’ (Harris 2001, p. 201). What had happened was that I had lost access to the 
playful daydreaming of the imagination. I had made writing such hard work. I began to 
suspect that I could not write any more, that there would be no more books. My 
imagination was dying. I had, to use Flaubert’s terms, lost my erection as a writer.  
Did this mean that I now had to move on to different kind of writing? Perhaps 
less intense, perhaps easier to do?  
The problem did not go away. In 1999 and 2000, the Arapax masked it. Then the 




a book called Mediterranean Women. I would interview dozens of women who lived in 
Mediterranean countries and in this way I would accumulate first-hand material. Using 
the internet, I cobbled together an impromptu data base and sent out an exploratory 
questionnaire. I began to correspond and chat. I was ravenous for details of the lives of 
these women. A surge of manic excitement engulfed me. Perhaps this would make a 
great book?  
I had become a kind of vampire, feeding on their stories.  It was something more 
urgent and personal than simply gathering material. (Ultimately, I couldn’t use most of 
the material anyway . . .) The project was coming from a desperate need for intimacy. I 
needed to listen to the private lives of women. This was the realisation of an 
overwhelming interior need, a need to escape the solitary space of my childhood self. 
I was quite unconscious of what I was doing. All I knew was the elation I felt, 
an erotic thrill which I explained as just the excitement of a powerful inspiration.  Lacan 
wrote: ‘Sublimate as much as you like; you will have to pay for it with something. And 
this something is called jouissance. I have to pay for that mystical operation with a 
pound of flesh.’  (Lacan, Miller & Porter 1992, p. 322) I had unknowingly embarked on 
a dangerous project. 
It took me about six months to realise that what I had been doing all that time 
was not really writing a book, not really conducting sociological research. I had 
ventured back into the obsessive realms of desire. It was my old problem from 1996, the 
problem I connected with France, which had manifested in the daemonic, but which I 
had hidden away in the dark. I was still looking for the muse, the other my deepest mind 
needed to rejuvenate itself.  







Swan Bay (2003) was written mainly between 1997-2000. Mine was an interior 
life paralysed on the shores of Swan Bay in the town of Queenscliff, where I then lived, 
just like the sick woman in my novel whom I located there. I was living an inauthentic 
life, no longer able to harness the old energy from my unconscious, and yet unable to 
face up to the fact that I had gone through some fundamental change in 1996, a kind of 
psychic disintegration. I wasn’t yet able to admit to myself the whole truth about who I 
was. So that when the Mediterranean Women project occurred to me in 2000, it was a 
kind of necessity: it was the only way I could go forward as an artist. Dr S. said it was 
the spirit being attracted to any signs of life.  
All novels, all stories, are created out of psychic need. There’s an ache in the 
soul that the story needs to tell. So now I had to ask myself: What is my psychic need? 
How is it connected with women? Am I searching for one woman who can give me 
peace? Or do I have to search for that peace in my life all alone? Do I need women now 
at this stage of my life because I married so young, and did not have enough ‘stories’ 
when I was young? Was I simply trying to live more in middle age? Trying to make up 
for my lack of experience?  
Other questions: was I living in a dead relationship? For how long had my 
marriage been dead? For how long can one go on living in a dead relationship, without 
something essential in oneself becoming dead too? I realised that those signals of 
‘deadness’ lay in my writing crisis of 1997-2000, when I just could not bring that 
‘marriage novel’ alive.  
One section of that long-laboured-on novel, which had been an attempt to do on 




too, was difficult to write because it was tainted by traces of the earlier, miscarried 
novel. Swan Bay: a choked and claustrophobic book about a sick and dying woman—
the soul in me dying?  A sick anima? A dying anima? 
Without my intending it, it was time to grow up. It was time to leave the house 
and risk meeting a stranger outside the walls of the bourgeois home. I was seeking 
women not for pleasure, but for meaning; I was seeking my rebirth as a person and an 
artist. This project, Mediterranean Women, which had so casually occurred to me, 




Every attempt at writing the self will inevitably create a different story. Thus, 
every attempt to write a reliable account is doomed, indeed self-doomed, self-
sabotaged. ‘Giving birth to yourself in language,’ as Doubrovsky puts it, ‘(re)producing 
yourself in the symbolic are only mystified desires. The writer will need to accept 
writing as the location of his own lack.’ (Doubrovsky 1986, p. 112) The first-person ‘I’, 
as Derrida also understood, will always get the better of the author, indeed will always 
turn against the author. (Derrida 1976, p. 108) 
This is not ‘autobiography’ in the sense of being a historical account of my 
writing life which includes all the major events. Rather, it might be described as a 
thematic reflection on my life and practice. It follows a single thread through my life, 
and in this sense it suggests a theory of creativity. What I have wanted to do here—and 
what I will continue to do in subsequent chapters of this exegesis—is to explore the 




My aim is not only to record, to speculate, to theorise creativity, but also to 
evoke for the reader something of the feeling of being inside the writer-who-I-was (even 
if those feelings will never be the same as my own lost feelings). And if now and then I 
create scenes (using the techniques of fiction, which are often merely the powers of 
suggestion and which seduce the reader), that would not of course make this account 
any more or less historically verifiable, given the unreliable nature of all 
autobiographical acts.   
A fiction writer reaches an age when self-awareness affects his or her relation to 
the unconscious in the creative process. Another way of putting this is that one makes a 
sincere but impossible attempt not to lie to oneself. Perhaps one is not able to lie to 
oneself any more in quite the same way. For perhaps those lies the youthful writer told 
himself are indispensable? After such knowledge, what forgiveness?  
The mature writer is not the same as the person who published a first book. He 
or she is calmer, more manipulative, perhaps psychopathic in his detachment. His anger 
grows up and wears a suit, but rage it still is. Matisse said that the only thing that drove 
him to paint was the rising urge to strangle someone (Spurling 1998, p. 24). 
Something happened to me. We might call it an experience of enlightenment or 
a conversion to the discourse of the analyst, whereby I understood how the rituals and 
repetitions of an artist’s practice ‘grow out of the repetition of our complex’(Ulanov 
2013, p. 112).  
And those things about me which were kept in the dark and fuelled the fiction, 
were in the dark no more. The artist gains his reason, but loses his talent. Whatever the 
pluses and minuses, he will never be the same again.  
Art is not a rational or a reasonable thing. Artists are not reasonable people. And 




adjusts the way one behaves towards other people. And perhaps this is the end of the 
artist.  










Chapter Three    





I had arrived at a point in my late forties where I felt I was unable to go on 
squeezing novels from the winepress of my unconscious. But does psychological 
growth necessarily mean a loss of talent? Is the cure also the moment we cease to be 
artists? Is it better—is it necessary—for the artist to remain mentally ill, if that is what it 
is to create from the unconscious, as numerous contemporary studies linking creativity 
and mental illness (typically bipolar disorder) would have it? 
Pierre Janet, a contemporary of Freud, claimed that  
 
the aim of psychotherapy was to transform traumatic experiences into a 
narrative by which we can externalise and process the experience. The healthy 
individual is that person who has a continuous consciousness for their 
accumulated life experiences without gaps or missing information; a coherent 





But the artist is not that kind of ‘healthy individual’. The ‘healthy individual’ 
will never write a novel. For the writer, to ‘externalise and process’ the repressed 
material is precisely the opposite of the creative process of writing a story. The fiction 
can only grow from the gaps, from unconscious desire for that which is missing. Fiction 
grows in the dark when, unpremeditated, the veil of the unconscious grows thin. It is ‘a 
latent process of unconscious preparation often preceding a sudden awakening’ (James 
2008, p. 184). 
The unconscious does not disappear once we realise a thing or two about 
ourselves. Desire continues until the subject dies. A little enlightenment might take 
place, a degree of psychological self-awareness. We might glimpse unsuspected depths 
in the self, the shape of our interior terrain. But unconscious desire continues generating 
forbidden pleasures, just as impossible to grasp or to define as ever.  




How much does the writer’s invention invest in the truth stakes? What does the 
fantasy know? The corollary: how much of the story is naive? How much does his 
invention evade or avoid the truth of his desire? To what extent is the story wish-
fulfilment, the untruth of the ego—the story the subject habitually needs to tell himself, 
and therefore not remarkable or interesting?  
The engine that makes the fiction is also the engine that causes much suffering 
in our lives. This is true of every novelist. That ‘engine’ is the problematic Subject, with 
its splintered subjectivity and unstable identity. Splintering and instability are crucial to 




Perhaps all artists have a predisposition to ‘falling’ and ‘glimpsing’ in the 
manner of de Kooning, as well as ‘falling’ in another way, infatuation with certain ideas 
or people, coming under their influence, as with the muse. We want to ‘fall’ because we 
want to have access to that energy. This is the emotional vampirism of the artist. The 
artist draws on the same power as the psychopath, as Diamond would have it (1996). As 
individuals, we might not be actual psychopaths, but we belong to the same clan.  
The skills of craft are nothing in themselves. The craft of writing is perhaps no 
more than a reservoir of experience that comes from years of rewriting, cutting and 
polishing sentences, then discovering some unguessed meaning in the excised text 
which then has to be restored.  
Fiction is, in essence, putting on a mask and finding a voice. As such, a first 
draft is always the work of an hysteric. There is a sense that the writing brain is not 
making decisions, a sense of oneself as a kind of passive conduit to a voice. Apparently 
autonomous voices pass through us. When one writes something rapidly, a voice in the 
mind is speaking the thoughts. Utterly impossible to calculate technical strategies at this 
stage. This is effortless freehand. The right occasion has fortuitously offered itself, the 
writing is unpremeditated and we are surprised by what comes out. The pleasure of 
fantasising comes from subjecting ourselves to a power that seems to exist outside 
ourselves. But at the same time the excitement is cathartic, the purging of psychic 
material. It is a form of hysteria, and the hysteric speaks with a mouth of gold, 
according to Lacan: ‘Why did Freud substitute these mouths of gold he had collected…’ 
(Seminar XVII, 18.2.1970). 
It is sometimes said that the first draft conceals more than it reveals. In the first 
draft, there is a hidden structure where the final story, the novel-to-be might be 




mind, the mind that cannot admit things to itself. It’s the most important things we 
never talk about. We have to learn the novel’s own secret language, as though it were a 
patient on the analyst’s couch. ‘To be yourself is to invent your own language.’ 
(Doubrovsky 1986, p. 37)  
It is an idea germane to the way memoir and fiction have tended to merge since 
Doubrovsky and autofiction—or since Proust, really, though it was Doubrovsky who 
excavated the autofiction seams in Proust, the hidden network of semen and ink, for the 
libidinal images that inform the writing (Doubrovsky 1986). 
Language and voice in fiction are incantations of the unknown or mysterious, 
not mere communication of what is obvious. Even when attempting to write about one’s 
own actual experiences, one is always coming to terms with something hidden or elided. 
The ‘gaps or missing information’ in ourselves (contra Janet) hold the potential to 
animate a story. How to get there? How to discover this buried gold? How to harness 
this power? What is the passkey that allows us to gain access to this secret world? So 
that we can reach a flow state in which the stories ‘arrive; they surprise; they are 
foreign, not invented by us, yet make us feel deeply recognized’ (Ulanov 2013, p. 122).  
The novelist needs to gain crucial psychological distance from ‘the facts’ of his 
life in order to half glimpse the hidden. Fiction is the mask which gives us permission to 
tell a certain kind of truth—a truth which we are not normally able to tell, and which 
requires some kind of tripping or slippage, the dipping of the madeleine in the cup of 
tea, as in psychoanalysis.  
The storytelling voice can only be summoned when we are in disguise. Putting 
on the mask of ‘the narrator’ allows us to invent freely without any sense of inhibition, 
shame or responsibility. There is a minimal but crucial distance between even an 




impersonation in order to discover an unsuspected yet authentic self—one self among 
many in the kaleidoscopic subject-who-writes, who is also the being-who-lacks.  
Trying to write fiction which is somehow ‘officially’ commensurate with 
autobiographical facts is futile. The lineage of autofiction, which begins with Proust and 
continues today with the likes of Knausgaard, Lerner and Cusk, problematizes its status 
as truth. This radical interrogation of correspondences and differences between the 
narrator, the apparently factual experience, and the author, might even be said to be at 
the heart of their project. People sense the inherent drama and risk in unmasking, the 
theatre of the self, and how the urge to reveal in fiction is in perpetual tension with the 
desire to conceal. The reader derives a perverse pleasure from the novel’s indecent gaze 
into the intimate interior lives of the characters. The reader becomes even more excited 
when the author turns that indecent gaze upon himself.  
While such a claim is at odds with contemporary discourse, such an 
understanding of literature suggests that there is no place for ethics, civic responsibility 
or public relations in the wild desire of fiction. As Lacan shows in Seminar VII, the task 
or aim of analysis is not ‘the function of the good’: ‘There is no other good than that 
which may serve to pay the price for access to desire.’ (Lacan 1992, p.321)  Nor is the 
function of the good the task or aim of fiction. Its function is éclat—a kind of outburst 
of splendour that gives intense pleasure. The novel must gratify the reader with éclat, an 
aesthetic experience inescapably intersected by desire. An agenda of ethics, identity 
politics, fairness or tact is more like a curated public image than the stuff of the novel, 
which comes from the back of the mind as a kind of speaking without thinking. Fiction 







Authors often comment that during composition their characters seem to have 
their own will, and make their own decisions independent of the author’s schema. 
Characters are voices who speak through the author. These voices are enjoyable for the 
author because they seem to be plugged in to the power of the Other, and are connected 
with what Lacan calls the discourse of the hysteric (Lacan 2007).   
The Lacanian real is not just meaningless dust, the sole of the shoe, the slag left 
over from signifier-formation. The irruption of the real is the experience of the 
schizophrenic—not just the discourse of the Other, but a multiplicity of voices, a 
psychic landscape of pure terror. It is also the domain of mystical experiences, which 
seem to come from beyond the kingdom of the signifier, beyond the limits of the 
symbolic. That’s why Lacan wrote that ‘madness is a schooling in the passions of the 
soul’.  (Lacan 1966, p. 7)   
Just as the child’s initiation into the symbolic involved a violent fragmentation 
of the early self, the journey of a new novel also involves a fragmentation of certain 
assumptions about what that book might or should be—a ‘breakdown’ of identity, a 
disintegration of the subject position. 
Until my late-forties, my fiction had been a kind of displacement of the inner life 
which I had to discover in order to give me aesthetic satisfaction, or a sense of meaning, 
or even self-esteem. The success of my first book, Julia Paradise, on the model of the 
‘distanced’ novel of Flaubert, the prose crafted and polished to the point where the 
author was as if absent, leaving no fingerprints, became for me, at this time in my life, 
something that was ultimately dead. I felt a need to write about my own personal 




In retrospect, I see the writer’s block I experienced at that time as a kind of 
miserliness, an economisation of the writer’s self where I felt a need to ‘save myself 
up’, to avoid making withdrawals from the libidinal space where composition becomes 
possible. My fiction had dried up, but I was attempting to write non-fiction about 
Mediterranean cultures, travel writing; it was an attempt to write a self who no longer 
needed to wear the mask of fiction. I wanted more of my own life in my books—
undisguised—just as I wanted to admit to my own taboo desires. I also felt, during this 
period of crisis in my life, that in losing faith in fiction, I was continuing my journey as 
a writer which is, after all, a spiritual, not just an artisanal thing. That was the reason I 
wanted to become a writer in the first place. It was a spiritual calling. I felt the urge to 
be a writer as others might feel the call to be a priest, alchemist, shaman.  But that non-
fiction writing was highly self-conscious and (to me) unsatisfying. I found that I needed 
the mask, the voice of fiction after all. It would be another dozen years before I would 
finish my autobiographical novel, The Mothers (Jones 2015).  
Half of writing is sensing or intuiting something which is not quite there (as the 
analyst does), responding to those moments or moods or feelings that can only be half-
glimpsed or half-said. That’s also where the block happens. As Fowles describes it, 
‘Both technique and that bizarre face of the imagination that seems to be more like a 
failure to remember the already existent than what it really is— a failure to evoke the 
non-existent—kept me miserably aground.’ (Fowles 1977b, p. 5)  The other half of 
writing is improvising characters and scenes that might somehow approximate those 







Burwick argues that literature, while ‘born of the irrational . . . must take up 
residence in a world of rational discourse’ (Burwick 1996, 164); it must become 
comprehensible, despite arising from unreason. As Frank Kermode argues, it is also the 
case  that the ‘borderline between fantasy and fact . . . is the territory of fiction’. 
(Kermode 2001, pp. 8-9) This would seem to match Lacan’s location of the unconscious 
in the uncertainty between the real and the imaginary. Pure fantasy is weak, thin, 
insubstantial. Yet pure fact is heavy, it won’t fly. The fantasy and factual leaven each 
other, there is a mysterious symbiosis, and a story is born. These are the tensions 
between the rational and irrational that characterise the nature of writing. However, I am 
against critical discourse which tries to explain away that which must remain essentially 
mysterious in art. In this I echo, as I have suggested, Susan Sontag’s call for an erotics 
rather than a hermeneutics of art (Sontag 1966, p. 10). 
One must also take care with psychoanalytic approaches to creativity, something 
which Lacan himself cautions us about: ‘To explain art by the unconscious seems very 
suspicious to me. To explain art by the symptom seems more serious to me.’ (Lacan 
1975) Lacan was even more specific about the dangers of contaminating the artistic 
process with the discourse of analysis: ‘Attributing an author’s avowed technique to 
some neurosis: boorishness. Or again, by showing it to be an explicit adoption of certain 
mechanisms which would thereby make an unconscious edifice of it: stupidity.’ (Lacan 
1965, p. 192) 
A novel can’t be analysed in the same way as a subject because ‘The written is 
in no way in the same register or made of the same stuff . . . as the signifier’.  (Lacan 
1999, p. 29)  It’s futile to seek the author’s personal unconscious behind an art work. As 
Lacan explains, ‘Joyce has not spoken to us, he has written, and when one writes one 




unconscious is real or imaginary? It takes part in an ambiguity between the two.’ (Lacan 
2018, p. 44) 
Writing can access the real but never the true? Because all writing can know is 
desire. The scalding clarity, the volcanic intensity, which is to say the purity, of certain 
works of literature or painting seem to spurt up from a mysterious core of powerful 
feeling. In writing my own novels, I have experienced this as a kind of controlled 
ferocity.  
The freehand of the imagination, the flow of fantasy, should (we assume) be 
pleasurable. The writing of a story has no point other than in its own pleasure. But the 
libidinal space where composition becomes possible is not a safe, sunny playroom. It is 
a dark space, as I have already described it, already contaminated, already a source of 
anxiety, because of the hidden agenda of the self, because of the desire to allow this 
potential self its incarnation . Of course, that self cannot be discovered because, 
according to Lacan, ‘As soon as you ask What-does-so-and-so-want? you enter into the 
function of desire, and you bring out the master-signifier’ (Lacan 2007, p. 166). Desire 
is unable to transcend the signifier towards some kind of all-powerful, all-knowing 
Logos. Deleuze similarly writes of ‘the indivisible character of desire’ (Deleuze 2008, 
p. 79). 
Yet there is in fiction (writing and reading) a kind of orgasmic enjoyment in 
entering the fantasy world, and the pleasure of the novel is always somehow a forbidden 
pleasure. The writer engages in a kind of espionage on his own secret life (secret even 
from himself) and he makes this possible by creating a slight but necessary distance by 
targeting not himself but his characters. Thus the novelist’s (and the reader’s) gaze is 
necessarily voyeuristic. The gaze is not drawn by that which is morally worthy, or that 




words, ‘Why should it be one’s ethical duty to go in search of “desire’s measure” 
operative in art, religion and science? Why confront these liveable kinds of pleasure 
economies…?’ (Kesel 2009, p. 98) What we want to glimpse is desire and its secrets. 
Libido in Latin means both pleasure and desire, yet in psychoanalytic discourse 
the two terms are discrete. Pleasure for Freud was a drive or a principle, while desire 
relates directly to the Lacanian notion of lack. Creativity—uncensored—is a product of 
the libidinal economy. The spontaneous urges and inspirations of fiction are 
‘polymorphously perverse’. This phrase (Freud 1905 (1962)) relates to the inherent 
sexual perversion of children before they have been socialised into acceptable 
behaviour. We can see traces of this pre-socialised child, untamed and uncensored, in 
the work of the artist.  
The unconscious is a secret self (secret from our thinking) which nevertheless 
gives us continuity as subjects (Lacan contra Janet), and which, against our wills, 
defines us. This secret self is unknown to ourselves except in half-glimpses and half-
saying. Thus, I have suggested, there is no epiphany when the unconscious reveals itself 
and one suddenly ceases to be a writer. There is no psychotic breakdown where chaos 
irrupts through the signifying networks of the subject and purges the unconscious; no 
catharsis can render the unconscious empty. Those people who advise to ‘write what 
you know’ should be more precise, and advise instead, in the general spirit of Lacan, to 
write everything you do not know even while knowing it. These are the themes and 
situations we obsessively return to in fantasy and imagination. We cannot remember 
them, only repeat them.  
Does this mean that writing is somehow outside the signifier chains in the 
symbolic? Or is it that the signification in writing cannot be read the same way as a 




not in the pen or the keyboard. It’s called the talking cure, not the writing cure, for a 
reason. But what of the éclat (Lacan, Seminar VII), the irruption of the irrational, the 
mystic’s ecstasy, the spurt of inexpressible traumatic knowledge beyond the signifier? 
How does fiction achieve that moment of éclat? 
This appears in what I like to think of as sideways movement in a novel, when 
the iron bar of character must be seen to bend (O'Connor 1985, p. 218), when there is a 
movement away from linear story and the character gets lost or experiences άτη 
(‘blindness’, ‘self-willed doom’), and the through-line of plot is subverted by desire. 
That desire often takes a seemingly obvious (sexual) form. Colin Wilson claims that 
‘the imagination is like an engine that can work on many different fuels; but it must be 
powered. And sex, properly used, is a fuel of high potency.’ (Wilson 1973, pp. 154-5) 
The novel can’t stay stuck in its own desire, a car whirring bogged in mud, and desire is 
the fuel that often provides the character with a hitherto unsuspected access to the real. 
But it is a desire that in a crucial sense remains mysterious.  
In my own novels, the real has also involved a turn towards social or political 
contexts, for example the Sino-Japanese war in Julia Paradise, or the native American 
genocide implicit in frontier theory in Billy Sunday. Characters (like people) are shut 
out of their own lives, and it takes the hidden desire uncovered by a key moment in the 
story—an epiphany or catharsis, something irrational or mysterious, where one way or 
another the unsuspected real irrupts into the limited point of view—for the character we 
thought we knew, the character who thought he knew himself, to be violently re-
injected back into his own life. There has been some crucial ambiguity in the character’s 
situation all along, a blind spot, something formerly inexpressible, a traumatic kernel—




In this way, the linear structure of the novel is always subverted by desire. The 
narrative arc is shaped by that which has been missing (elided). That’s why key 
realisations are psychological, not tricks or ‘plot twists’. But there is also something 
unstable and disruptive in the hidden core of the novel for the author, something 
puzzling, elided, forgotten or foreclosed, which can only be hinted or guessed at. This is 
something beyond the signifiers, beyond the symbolic, an inexpressible, unknowable 
trauma hidden in the real, which the writer cannot apprehend directly, or even locate, 
but which exercises an uncanny influence on the themes and register of the novels 
nevertheless. Act II moves towards a climax when the writing gets closer to Das Ting, 
but Act III is satisfying only in so far as it moves away from it. Because characters 
cannot be ‘finalized’ or completely understood, the layers of story cannot be neatly tied 
up or resolved, but are best left to continue in a dialogue with the reader’s imagination 
(Bakhtin 1984, p. 89). Likewise, the author’s desire cannot be finalized or understood, 
and is transformed by the author’s imaginative representation of it. 
Derrida argues that that which cannot be spoken can be written, but this is 
awkward because, by privileging the letter, he posits a readable unconscious, that is, an 
unconscious which is capable of being more than the ‘half-said’ and which therefore has 
its status of crucial ambiguity curtailed or reduced. It is also the case that the subject 
who writes is different from the subject who speaks. The speaking subject reveals or 
betrays himself unconsciously, whereas the writing subject can only reveal knowledge 
about the writing itself, not the subject who wrote it. This is explaining art by the 
symptom. In his famous discussion of Poe’s classic short story, and in his debate with 
Derrida on that story, Lacan writes, ‘We cannot say of the purloined letter that, like 
other objects, it must be, or not be, in a particular place, but unlike them . . . it will be 




It is precisely the purloined nature of the letter that distinguishes the literary 




If, according to classic ideas of psychoanalysis, it’s the hidden or forgotten 
feeling inside us which cannot be admitted that makes us sick, then this is also the 
daemon that drives the writer and excludes the writer from ‘normal’ life. The blind spot, 
the aggressive tendencies, the rage, are also the deep core, the dynamo of creativity. 
They provide in secret the claws and wings of the novel, to use Nabokov’s phrase again 
(Nabokov 2008, p. 354). 
In Nabokov’s ‘wings’ and ‘claws’ we might glimpse the sadism (and 
masochism) of the novelist: the purging gesture of the hysteric is intersected by the 
repeated cutting of the obsessive. There can be no novel without cruelty, even if its 
object is Aristotelian pity and terror, because the form of the novel is a paranoid 
construction. Plotting and technique are devised to tease, manipulate and seduce the 
reader, deferring the climax, even giving the reader a perverse pleasure in its deferral. 
Every trace of fear and desire is caught up in a web of overdetermination towards the 
final sentence, in what V.S. Pritchett called ‘the principle of procrastinated rape’ 
(Pritchett 1966, p. 25). 
Lacan, as we have seen, explains this deferral of the truth via the principle that 
‘We are unable to state anything at all about the relationship between knowledge and 
truth except by half-saying’ (Lacan 2007, p. 143). He even says that ‘What I am telling 




I am writing in this exegesis. Lacan also argues that ‘What best incarnates half-saying is 
myth,’ (144) which lies ‘Behind history’ (Lacan 2018, p. 48). 
Myth, which also tends to the traumatic and cruel, might be likened to the 
structure of the unconscious because it deals with the kind of taboo material which 
resists being expressed in the symbolic. The stuff of myth is beyond language; it 
belongs to the domain of the gods, that to which is sometimes attached the 
transcendental Logos Lacan discusses in relation to Antigone. (Kesel 2009; Lacan 
1992) The taboo content of myth concerns those hard kernels of trauma in the Lacanian 
real that can only be half-said. Myths are structured like paranoia, according to the 
Surrealist André Breton. (Breton & Rosemont 1978) 
The unconscious, thus, does not produce original stories ex-nihilo, challenging 
the egocentrism of most writers and complicating the individuality of neurosis. The 
unconscious consists of signifying material already structured in language. Just as the 
unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan), its dreams, fantasies and narratives 
follow the shapes, designs and themes of myth. For many of us in the West, these are 
the Greek myths.  
The act of rape is the theme of so many myths that it might be considered as one 
of those hard kernels of trauma in the Lacanian real that can only be half-said—the stuff 
of nightmares and fantasies, involving fears and desires which cannot be faced up to 
directly, as well as a kind of primal scene of sexuation and gendering. ‘Human history 
always begins for the Greeks with the rape of a woman,’ Nicole Loraux writes, and 
‘Helen’s kidnapping is the model for all that follows’ (Loraux 1995, p. 195). Loraux 
also suggests that the Greek way of reflecting on sexuality is ‘so lightly concealed in the 




There is something traumatic at the root of all myths. For Freud, the stories that 
make up myths are also the ‘distorted vestiges of the wishful fantasies of whole nations, 
the secular dreams of youthful humanity’ (Freud 1908, p. 152).  
Why was the myth of Oedipus Freud’s central myth? It might be helpful here to 
think of myths as signifiers of delusional, paranoid paternity systems.  
For Lacan in Seminar IV, ‘a myth . . . is understood as responding to the 
inexplicable nature of the real’. (Rabaté 2003, p. 45) We need myths because the real is 
unknowable; myth acts out or performs an indivisible trauma in the real that can only be 
half-said. According to Lacan, classical myth aims to give an epic form or a narrative 
form to a fluid or inchoate psychic structure (Rabaté 2003, p. 48), which we take on as 
our own. There is thus a radical otherness at the core of the unconscious (Homer 2005, 
p. 44): ‘The child enters the symbolic order as a subject of lack’ (Homer 2005, p.56) 
and is thus colonized by myth.  As Lacan puts it, ‘This is the very effect of the 
unconscious in the precise sense we teach that the unconscious means that man is 
inhabited by the signifier.’ (cited in Homer 2005, p.48).  
Myths might be seen as ‘originary texts’—the phrase un Texte primatif, not the 
context, is Foucault’s—or the foundations of discursive practices (Foucault 1966, p. 
56). Their recurrences, iterations and variations do not exhaust this ‘originary’ status. 
This is because myths are elemental or archetypal forms of desire which have the 
function of suggesting the unsayable, the elided or foreclosed material that is beyond 
language. Myths are also at the origins of ourselves. For Lacan, the unconscious—
structured like a language—predates the subject so that there is a leakage of the subject 
through the ‘rupture’ from this occluded material into the Lacanian real. So there is a 
trauma at the heart of subjectivity, an unknowable kernel of hurt. Notably, the word 




Literary language is wounded language.  
The knot of language is tied over the kernel of trauma. This secret wound both 
energizes and neuroticizes the writer, this ungrounded and unstable subject, this typing 
being-of-lack. A story’s ability to mediate the elusive trauma is therefore something 
transgressive, engaging rage and horror, just as myths seem to be refracted through the 
Sadeian imagination.  
My novels might seem to a certain reader to share a similar mental terrain, or 
repeat a pattern, or return to the same obsessions, every time as if for the first time. But 
‘we do not refind (retrouver), or rather, we only ever turn in circles. We find.’ (Lacan 
2018, p. 48) So it is in writing novels. We find. Over and over again. As if for the first 
time. The creative act is always as if for the first time because according to Freud there 
is no time in the unconscious. ‘In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of 
time, no recognition of the passage of time’. (Freud 1940, p. 498) And while my novels 
might share a family resemblance, the author never repeats himself, for every iteration, 
however familiar, is an original act. We might turn in circles but we never remember the 
last time we were ‘here’.  
There are compulsive and obsessive aspects to all writing, common to other 
forms of addiction. But one’s compulsive daily returns to the house of fiction to wager 
on sentences, one’s frequent losses and occasional wins, are different from the empty 
rituals of the poker machine addict. The gambler’s reward is a meaningless shower of 







Our obsessions are our material. We write out of ‘what we don’t know even 
while knowing it’. Like de Kooning, we need to let ourselves ‘slip’ into the process. 
The glimpses and the half-saying are all we have. We will always half-glimpse similar 
scenes (or cognate scenes) and half-say similar phrases right through our writing lives. 
As Nabokov explains in his afterword to Lolita, ‘These are the nerves of the novel. 
These are the secret points, the subliminal coordinates by means of which the book is 
plotted—although I realize very clearly that these and other scenes will be skimmed 
over and not noticed’ (Nabokov 2008, p. 318). 
Even though the first draft can be a more or less unmediated irruption from the 
unconscious, a kind of ‘truth born in the mouth’, there is the element of temperament 
that will decide how the subsequent drafts develop, the torments of the obsessive, the 
masochistic cutting of one’s text, the endless rewriting that corresponds with complex 
emotional needs and desires. Finding the right words, in the right order, is the cure for 
something.  
Since writing conjures up traces of double-inscription for the writer, including 
the kernel of deathly fascination exiled in the real and connected with death, the process 
of writing is self-destructive, the revisions akin to masochistic ‘cutting’ disorders. This 
process is different for the reader, though no less submissive and masochistic, as the 
signifying chain has been polished so that desire glides smoothly to its (temporary) 
climax. The satisfactions of a novel are temporary because the desire the reader 
encounters is registered pleasurably in the moment of éclat. The reader’s lack cannot of 
course be permanently satisfied by any artwork.  
Eroticism is the problematic part of ourselves. Language does not exist 
independently of the play of taboo and transgression (Bataille 1962, p. passim). The 




There’s something behind it that’s deathly, toxic, murderous. No Eros without 
Thanatos. Lacan would point to the domain of jouissance and its self-destructive 
repetitive compulsions, since it ‘begins with a tickle and ends with a blaze of petrol’ 
(Lacan 2007, p. 72). 
Lacan locates hidden trauma in the real close to the death drive, so in the 
perversely pleasurable routines and rituals of narrative practice there are elements of 
shame and masochism. We sadistically subject the reader to uncomfortable emotional 
situations, but the author also submits to a power he doesn’t understand, and which is 
connected to his own death for ‘desire comes from the Other, and jouissance is located 
on the side of the Thing.’ (Écrits, 853) 
The furtive process of composing a novel has an air of secrecy and subterfuge, 
excitement and shame. A novel is a secret life, but it is also a shadow life. It grows out 
of the jouissance connected with hidden trauma which we can only half know or half 
glimpse. Behind even the most polished style, behind the calmest magisterial narrative 
voice is rage, anger, violence. Every point of view which inscribes itself in the narrative 
is, in a sense, violent. And not only in terms of the Lacanian nom-du-pére and the 
violent conditions under which the child was initiated into the symbolic and the subject 
created. 
According to Deleuze, every plot is a web, every narrator a spider, in a way that 
accords with my experience that plots cannot be written objectively. He writes:  
 
A world can never be organised hierarchically and objectively, and even 
the subjective chains of association that give it a minimum of consistency or 




violently imbricated viewpoints, some expressing truths of absence and time 
lost, others the truths of presence or of time regained. (Deleuze 2008, p. 80). 
 
The cold fury, the aggressive gaze, the controlled ferocity which gives me the 
energy to write a new novel is the equivalent of Matisse’s ‘rising urge to strangle 
someone’. Who am I going to strangle? Every new novel is like an attempt to find out. 
That rage, enjoyable in an unhealthy way, is our brush with jouissance. It’s an 
attempt to demolish the unbearable Subject, to find meaning in the splintering of 
everyday language in a destructive ecstasy which might, however tangentially and 
apparently accidentally, approach the hidden kernel of trauma. It should be pointed out 
that the etymology of éclat, which Lacan takes to mean a brilliant bursting forth of 
radiance, also includes senses of bursting out, breaking violently, splitting and 
splintering.  
The orgasmic illusion promises our own obliteration as a Subject. Our literary 
language strains to transgress the limits of language, to burst the Symbolic, to deal 
(paradoxically through language) with the unspeakable. Our literary rage ‘strikes out 
against the prison house of language’ and rebels against ‘the senseless traumatic kernel 
that resides at the core of social language’ (Porter 2004, p. 14). The fiction is inevitably 
inscribed with these erotic, aggressive, even murderous, traces. 
Where else could the narrative voice come from? I will have more to say about 
this in the next chapter, but suffice to say for now that it cannot emerge from the tinny 
transistor radio of the ego. The stories we write are unknowable in advance. A story 
needs to discover its own language in order to generate power for other people. That 
literary register of language also has power over the author, for he is being addressed by 




on of a storytelling voice (or being taken over by a voice) is the source of the author’s 
power to enchant and compel. The voice speaks out of me or through me as I ‘listen’ or 
as I am addressed, but it also has another listener: the reader. Which of us is the 
hysteric? 
Reading fiction involves a subversion of the reader’s mental state, something 
more than the mere suspension of disbelief; it’s a kind of trance or hypnotic state. The 
fiction somehow plugs into one’s own libidinal economy. There’s a part of the reader 
that wants to temporarily defer individual critical scrutiny and submit to the will of the 
story. This is the reader’s self-effacement, his enjoyment of the Other. Knowledge is the 
enjoyment of the Other, according to Lacan (Lacan 2007, p. 1). When reading, the text 
inscribes itself in the reader like a lover, as the reader breathlessly waits to share the 















τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης, 
Plato has Socrates say in the Phaedrus (244a). The greatest gifts come to us through 
madness, provided that the madness is given to us by the gods. This idea is developed 
thus: ‘if any man come to the gates of poetry without the madness of the muses, 
persuaded that skill alone will make him a good poet, then shall he and his works of 
sanity with him be brought to nought by the poetry of madness’ (Plato, Phaedrus 245a). 
We might infer from Plato, then, that voice in literary fiction is something that 
transcends mere skill or technique. Those voices comes from the gods. But how do we 
hear them? 
 In life, there are superego voices (traces of the parental critical voices) and id 
voices (the belly-speaking demonic voices which urge us on to commit evil acts). In the 
work of Nietzsche, these might be assigned the functions of Apollo and Dionysus. 
Neither category can be discounted from narrative voice in fiction. This is not only 
because of the ways in which the dialogic self has come to be understood through 
literary studies—from Julian Jaynes and his concept of the bicameral mind (Jaynes 
1993), to the split subject of Lacan, or to the multi-voiced narrative extolled by Bakhtin 




in tongues, channelling demons or alien presences. Even research in neuroscience, 
describing the left and right hemispheres of the brain, tells us that the everyday self is 
dialogic.  
Voice is the touchstone of literary fiction, and that voice, sometimes defined as 
authorial presence, is also connected to the maxim that novelists are constantly writing 
their autobiographies as lies. The complexities in narrative voice might help us 
understand the Dionysian and Apollonian dialectic in the novel, which I have already 
touched upon: the inner tension between the desire to reveal (hysterical impulses which 
develop into characters), and the need to conceal key autobiographical information 
which might be read in a reductionist way. Of course, fiction is a product of a self, but 
that self can only be guessed at or half glimpsed in the fiction, in that it is always 
anterior to the novel (and to all the novels).  
The novel is a kind of anti-autobiography. It is the autobiography of a secret life 
that does not correspond in any direct or plausible way with the exterior or social self. It 
is so secret that it’s barely even conscious. And it surprises us when it speaks itself into 
the mind. It needs the right language to unleash it, it responds to the right words, almost 
like a magic spell, an incantation. But it has to be spoken. Fate comes from the word to 
speak.  
Narrative voice in literary fiction is of the same order as voice in lyrical poetry. I 
do not mean the auditory voice of the author at a public reading. That is like an actor’s 
voice, a curated voice. That voice is a plausible correlation of the author’s mind. What I 
mean is the more mysterious and hysterical voice that Pessoa evokes as the source of 
lyrical poetry. ‘The basis of lyrical genius is hysteria,’ wrote Pessoa (Monteiro 2000, p. 
56), suggesting the crucial role of impersonation or ventriloquism, which enables the 




which their ‘intrinsic hysteria’ informs their work: ‘The more pure and narrow the 
lyrical genius, the clearer the hysteria is, as in the case of Byron and Shelley’ (p. 56). 
Here Pessoa proposes a kind of hierarchy of hysteria, correlating with the quality and 
nature of the work. As Monteiro explains, ‘In the lyrical genius of the highest grade—
that which ranges over all types of emotion, incarnating them in persons and so 
perpetually depersonalising itself—the hysteria becomes, so to speak, purely 
intellectual.’  (Monteiro 2000, p. 56)  
As fiction writers, we also give ourselves permission to play the hysteric, to 
invent ourselves, to fantasise ourselves in a made-up world and under the guise of 
made-up people, to impersonate and ventriloquise, but only in order to discover 
ourselves. Identity is complex. There are aspects of ourselves we’re not aware of until 
the words are written. There are glimpses of ourselves and our lived experience which 
are almost always excluded from the socially responsible autobiographical gaze. And 
it’s these banned or censored glimpses, which carry the weight of primordial emotion, 
that are likely to grow into stories. Only the right voice can generate a story which is a 
kind of correlation to the original lost emotion. Voice then is a kind of magnetic effect 
(as argued by Plato in the Ion), which draws the hidden, the lost, the elided, into the 
story.  
Pessoa described the lyrical poet as a hysteric, but for Lacan every writer is a 
hysteric since he brings together the respective mechanisms of hysteria and art, 
obsessional neurosis and religion, paranoia and science (Lacan 1992, pp. 129-30). The 
hysteric never knows what he’s going to say next. The connections between thoughts in 
the hysteric are out of control. The thoughts and words and behaviour connect in sudden 
jerky spasms to confront that which is being avoided, the experience—no, not 




can explain everything about ourselves—but the sensations, the feelings which have 
been taken deep into the tissues of the body and which continue to seethe there. 
Hysterical discourse, like art, is organised around a void (Lacan 1992, p. 130).  
There can be something ecstatic and visionary in the hysteric, connected with 
the mythic elements of story, as his thoughts and words bubble up direct and 
unmediated from his underground life, in their haste to avoid dealing with that other 
area, or areas of feeling, also hidden away in his underground life.  
The hysteric may not want to be an hysteric, but even so, he takes pleasure in it. 
For the hysteric who writes fiction, it is this unexpected, and unpredictable, surging of 
ideas from the underground life that forms the pleasurable narrative moments. This 
hysterical pleasure enables the friction and ejaculation of narrative. And yet a 
pleasurable ejaculation of narrative for the author is not necessarily enjoyable for the 
reader. On the contrary, the reader may remain disengaged, frigid, unaroused. Thus plot 
is important. To plot a novel is one thing, but without the discovery of the right voice, 
the writing of a novel cannot be an adventure, and there can be no life or surprise in the 
language. 
 
                                                     # 
 
The novel, of course, is never merely a technical project of cold plans, notes, 
lists. Not even a plot that is schemed at and projected into the future, an arc which is 
shaped, employing the tools of cunning, manipulation and persuasion, is sufficient. The 
surge of energy in fiction comes from something beyond mere information, however 
carefully crafted and arranged. For there is something unpredictable and dangerous at 




results in a kind of beauty, the fluidity, the delight of surprise that only comes from 
some power untethered to the logical rigidity of blocks, lines, lists. That flow comes 
from voice. And while we think of voice as echoing the shape of the author’s mind, 
there is something less in control than this metaphor implies.  
In the novel, the tension between structure and flow—which might be roughly 
equated to the tension between the superego and the id—is never fully resolved. 
Structure can have a sense of completeness but flow, so full of emotion, the incantatory, 
the mystical, is limitless. If plot in literary fiction is said to be organic, that's because 
voice is its most important element. One enters the literary register as the lyrical 
impulse approaches a state of hysteria. This is not to say there is no control. Indeed, 
there is something very controlling about voice. It's just that there would be nothing to 
control without that wild desire. Lowell captures the artist’s struggle, which brings into 
tension ‘the Puritanical iron hand of constraint and the gushes of pure wildness’ (cited 
in Redfield Jamison 2017, p. 20). Even the most tightly leashed narrative voice contains 
its traces and scars, as sometimes in a tranquil suburb one can hear the animals from a 
distant zoo.  
The novel inevitably follows the shape cast in the author’s unconscious, and this 
is something different from the logic of the outline. Voice is always in some sense 
before language, which is to say, the voice is that of the Other. If narrative voice is the 
voice in the writer’s mind, and quite possibly in the reader's mind, then it is language 
which performs the sleight of hand, the confidence trick, the suspension of disbelief. It 
is the spontaneous voice which allows the momentary, mercurial flashes of insight 
which can never be planned, the ones which give the reader a sense of being closest to 




inner life. This requires surprise. This is the ‘surprise to the writer’ which is dictated by 
the voice in his mind.  
The commanding narrative voice is something which seems to be outside 
oneself, coming from elsewhere, like the muse or a god, yet at the same time it is as 
intimate as the whisper of confession. Whether we called it the dialogic self or auditory 
hallucinations is beside the point; for although an author might write many novels, each 
with its own unique narrative voice, the voice which commands the reader, or summons 
the reader into the story, is always the voice of the same self, or part of oneself, the old 
self. One might not even like that self very much from an ethical or moral point of view, 
but it is that facet of the self, that sound of the self, which is the only one capable of 
telling stories.  
In some ways, narrative voice is quite distinct from the imagination, in the way 
we usually think of imagination as something visual, as the movie in the mind. The 
narrative voice in fiction has elements of subjugation and we return to it in the way one 
might keep returning to an unhealthy obsession. In the Freudian paradigm, the superego 
is purely auditory: we hear traces of our parents’ voices which were inscribed in the self 
at an early childhood stage. These voices create the necessity for the unconscious, for 
that hidden repository of forbidden desire. In the childhood sensations of the 
unconscious that we carry around with us, we retain a sense of our parents as strangers, 
so that whatever emotional closeness we feel to them is combined with vague menace. 
This disjunction is connected with the uncanny. However, to understand voice as purely 
auditory is a limitation—as is to understand voice as a function of the superego. Larkin 
describes the urge to write thus, notably privileging the visual and unconscious: ‘it 




a combination of words that will preserve it by setting it off in other people. The duty is 
to the original experience.’ (Larkin 2007, p. 211) 
Visual fantasy, though, is more like the obsessive, repetitive loop of the neurotic 
than the ‘mouth of gold’ of the hysteric. So how do we bridge the gap with the ‘dead’ 
(and deadly) jouissance of fantasy and the liberating ‘pleasure of speaking the truth’ of 
narrative? Are there different kinds of jouissance involved in writing fiction? How is 
voice as Pessoan impersonation connected with the uncensored speech of the hysteric?  
If writing fiction is a practice of the letter (a practice of ‘grooming’ the signifier), what 
is the relation between Voice (a discovered hysterical self, one of many, which seems to 
pre-exist the moment of consciousness in composition) and the Word, which is the 
painstaking effort towards order, where ‘psychosis is an attempt towards rigour’? 
(Lacan 1975) 
The practice of the letter takes place in the symbolic—it’s the patient rewriting, 
following signifier chains, a kind of neurotic repetition which is distinct from the 
obsessive repetition of fantasy. In fact, if that kind of personal fantasy were sufficient, 
then there would be no urge nor necessity towards the practice of the letter. There is 
thus a troublesome reciprocal relationship between ‘the fantasy’ and ‘the words’. It’s 
not simply a matter of seeing pictures then trying to find words to convey the pictures, 
as Larkin would have it. The deepest pleasures of the fantasy are verbal. Not just in the 
sense of ‘technique’—say, the idea of far vedere explicated by Conrad, in his 
introduction to The Nigger of the Narcissus : ‘My task which I am trying to achieve is, 
by the power of the written word to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, 
to make you see.’ (Conrad 1914, p. preface). But what allows the writer to bridge the 




Narrative voice is at once the mark of the register of literary language and the 
hallmark of the hysteric. The hysteric needs a master to listen to their discourse, just as 
literary language needs a reader. Voice allows intimacy with the reader, and trust: like 
two people in bed sharing their secret fantasies. (Of course, there's a lot that can go 
wrong.) So, voice is more than mere seduction (in the sense of ‘leading astray’). There 
must be a moment, and early on, when the reader falls in love with the voice, when the 
reader hands over his power in a process which is the enjoyment of the other.  Just as 
the patient must accept that the analyst is ‘the one who knows’ (even though this is an 
illusion, as Lacan quite complacently points out), the reader, in giving up his 
scepticism, allows himself to be subjected to the voice, accepts the author-as-authority, 
as ‘the one who knows’—who knows how to write this book, and more, who knows a 
great deal of other things about life. ‘What the hysteric wants . . . is a master. That is 
absolutely clear . . . In other words, she wants a master over whom she reigns.’ (Lacan 
2007, p. 165)    
However, in order to speak with authority, we need to stumble upon the right 
voice, like the hysteric who wants the master in her command, who wants to possess 
mastery for herself. As Clemens puts it, ‘The hysteric’s function is to seek the truth the 
master appears to offer her . . . But the hysteric’s discourse has an affinity with the 
discourse of the master—this involves a move towards mastery on her own behalf.’ 
(Clemens 2011) 
There is something in the narrative voice (of even the mildest narrator, or most 
‘absent’ third-person narrator) that retains faint traces of hypnotic, incantatory magic 
from the earliest oral traditions, and which matches the hysteric’s insistence on being 
heard. Like the hysteric, the narrative voice insists on its right to speak. Endlessly. For 




critical appraisal is equivalent to the purging gestures of the classic Freudian hysterics 
who Lacan describes as ‘mouths of gold’: ‘Why did Freud mislead himself to this 
extent? …Why does he substitute for the knowledge he gathers from all these mouths of 
gold—Anna, Emma, Dora—this myth, the Oedipus complex?’ (Lacan, Seminar XVII, 




But what is the relation between the narrative voice and a character? Both come  
from what is hidden inside the writer’s self, and are an expression of Pessoa’s lyrical 
and hysterical poet. Characters are invented from the dark mulch of experience. But the 
atom of character is radically unstable. The narrative voice which speaks the character 
can also bend him. In fact, it is impossible for a character to be entirely drawn from life. 
Take a real person as model and the narrative voice will inevitably dream them. (Place 
in fiction, too, is always in a certain sense a ‘dreamt place’.) But voice and character are 
also made diabolical by the dialogism at the heart of the subject.  
In Lacan’s view, the subject is split into je and moi. The je speaks only in order 
to hear an answer in the Other, je. An answer that validates in the symbolic what the 
moi imagines itself to be. ‘The Other is therefore the locus of the I who speaks along 
with the he who hears, what is said by the one being already the reply, the other 
deciding, in hearing it, whether the one has spoken or not.’ (Lacan 1966, pp. 132-3) 
Lacan asks: ‘Who, then, is this other to whom I am more attached than to myself, since, 
at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is still he who agitates me?’ (Lacan 1977, 
p. 172) When it comes to imagining stories and characters, this agitation within the 




of impersonation and characterisation are connected with purging and ejaculation; the 
point I would make about jouissance is that its source is outside the conscious agency of 
the subject. The agitation within the subject is connected with that unconscious 
jouissance, which is why, as Lacan says, it ‘begins with a tickle and ends with a blaze of 
petrol’. (Lacan 2007, p. 72) 
The same might be said of writing novels.  
Perhaps novels so often invent characters who commit acts of rape and murder 
(especially of women) not because the author makes the conscious choice to be 
gruesome for psychological or commercial reasons, nor to express some underlying 
misogyny, but because the literary register of language itself burbles up from those 
chaotic regions of the unconscious. Thus, the voice that energises character can move 
rapidly from psychotic rage to self-abnegation in the literary register in the same way as 
the hysteric’s discourse fluctuates wildly—for if either were to fall silent it would be the 
equivalent of suicide. The relationship between the light, hysterical impulse of the 
lyrical and the heavy, psychic debris of traumatic event is what best defines narrative 
voice. If narrative voice in the literary register—and the characters it energises—
weren’t marked by traces of hysteria, then it wouldn’t be interesting.  
An important point to make is that voice does not mediate or diminish the 
subjectivity of the characters—contra Bakhtin. Bakhtin sees Dostoevsky’s work as 
containing different voices, unmerged into a single perspective, not harmonised into the 
register and key of the choir-like authorial presence, and not merely ‘a mouthpiece for 
the author’s voice’ (Bakhtin 1984, p. 7). Each of these voices has its own subjectivity 
within the novel, a kind of ontological status.  However, voice is what allows the 
characters’ torments and contradictions to come into being. The authorial presence as 




the author-god to play with. The individual characters’ voices, which follow various 
threads of hysteria, are also part of narrative voice, not a subsidiary. Those various 
hysterical impulses are also where authorial presence comes from.  
The characters, and their speech, are simultaneously subject to the story (which 
seems to the reader the story the author was ‘born’ with, an essential life pattern which 
is him and of him) and they have agency, defined as the ability to shock or surprise the 
scribe of their spectral presences. That agency is, of course, a mediated agency given 
the author has the ability to make conscious decisions, albeit in a way nevertheless also 
mediated by that which they cannot know about themselves, the unconscious of the text.  
It is precisely this tension which makes characters at the same time radically 
Other to the author—not only distinct from the author’s persona, but from his 
overarching and indefinable presence—and exactly like him. As a character behaves 
and speaks in unpredictable ways during gestation and growth, their consciousness is as 
unknowable and enigmatic as the author’s own—and especially, of course, as the 
narrator’s own, whether in first person or third person narration.  
The character’s identity is just as unstable as the authorial presence, derived 
from the same generalised trauma-as-lack and hysterical, impulsive language. Authorial 
presence as voice mediates with the unknowable just as much as characters do. For it is 
only the persuasive voice that can give legitimacy to our fantasies. That claim to truth 
lasts only as long as the music of narrative voice lasts. It is temporary, limited to the 







The dialogism of the narrative voice and the subject also calls to mind the 
schizophrenic. Contemporary neurobiological research into creativity often makes this 
connection. For Jaynes, the poet and the schizophrenic are alike in channelling the voice 
of the gods through literary language. ‘The function of metre in poetry is to drive the 
electrical activity of the brain, and most certainly to relax the normal emotional 
inhibitions of both chanter and listener. A similar thing occurs when the voices of 
schizophrenics speak in scanning rhythms or rhyme’ (Jaynes 1993, p. 73). Referring to 
the works of Homer, which were conceived of as being inspired by the voices of the 
muses, he argues that ‘The gods were what we now call hallucinations’  (Jaynes 1993, 
pp. 73-5). Porter argues that this Homeric idea of creativity concords closely with ideas 
on splintered subjectivity and unstable identity in the psychoanalytical approach of 
Lacan (Porter 2004). 
To return to the idea of the muse, which is, as I have suggested, also of crucial 
importance to the contemporary writer of fiction, the novelist also conjures up voices 
which they locate outside themselves. Consciousness and subjectivity are deeply 
connected with this process of dialogue. In our normal state, we silently converse with 
ourselves in our thoughts. Fletcher and Frith argue that the normal dialogue we conduct 
with ourselves in our thinking process becomes altered in cases of schizophrenia 
(Fletcher & Frith 2009). 
Lysaker, building on theorists such as Nietzsche and Bakhtin, and the clinical 
work of (Hermans 1993) and (Gregg 1995), finds a 'sense of self among people in 
general normally develops out of dialogues both within individuals and between self 
and others'. (Lysaker 2002, p. 207) He suggests that schizophrenia might reflect a 
collapse of the ability to maintain ongoing dialogue within the self, specifically arguing 




into one of three forms: (a) a barren and empty self-organisation; (b) internal 
cacophony; or (c) self constructions dominated by rigid, non-evolving monologues 
(Lysaker 2002, p. 207). 
In schizophrenia, the patient hears one half of the interior dialogue as the voice 
of another, or even the Other. The sense of a unitary self becomes splintered, and the 
patient experiences a frightening, supernatural invasion of alterity.  
This suggests that the fiction writer in the throes of composition is in a state of 
attenuated agency, which has something in common with the wretched state of the 
schizophrenic. There is in writing down the words spoken from the back of the mind a 
certain degree of loss of rational control and a diminution of volition. Therefore, one 
has diminished responsibility for one’s words—at least until they are censored in 
revision, and redirected to a larger plan, though not necessarily a more rational one. 
After all, one was only the agent for words that have the autonomous status of a field of 
supernatural power, which structures our unconscious and which is, as J-A Miller 
argues, ‘connected to a subject who is a lack of being’ (Homer 2005, p. 21). 
The schizoid personality—whether understood as a splintered consciousness or 
empty subject—is particularly vulnerable, one might even say ‘suited,’ to the complex 
psychic and linguistic event of writing a novel just as much as to psychotic experiences 
and behaviour. The schizoid condition renders the individual personality ‘raw’ and 
vulnerable to irruptions of the irrational through the hidden workings of unconscious 
desire, to psychotic subjective experiences and hallucinations, and especially those 
involving hearing voices, as the interior dialogues of the multiform self, the ‘normal’ 
dialogic self. The schizophrenic and the writer are told what to do, as if by a god, while 




The literary register (of which voice is often seen as the most important aspect) 
tests the limits of everyday social language. The narrative voice, even when it is trusted 
by the reader, often relates key events indirectly. This is partly because they are taboo or 
disturbing experiences, involving material that cannot be fully integrated into 
consciousness. But the literary register, with its Pessoan echoes of the hysteric, often 
hints, foreshadows and uses indirection because the story can only be ‘half-said’. 
Literary fiction is thus told in a different voice from social language, which is limited by 
its own inability to acknowledge its own senseless core in the subject (Porter 2004).   
But this is precisely the function of narrative voice: to integrate the subject, 
which might be seen as arbitrary or incoherent.  For we must remember that the author 
is a desiring subject, a being of lack, a creature of unconscious desire which operates as 
both frame and stain. This secret wound both energises and neuroticises narrative voice. 
The letter in the unconscious always arrives at its destination but ‘the real “message”, 
the real letter awaiting us is the stain itself’ (Zizek 2008, p. 10). At the obvious level, 
the ‘stain’ in literary language and in voice, in particular, is a form of revenge, 
symbolically re-asserting control over the anterior traumatic material. Yet while we are 
accustomed to talking of voice in literary fiction in terms of mastery and control, it is 
more akin to lack of control, a divine madness. We have to accept the traces of the 
irrational in the voice that sings the story, its Dionysian roots as the dark brother of 
reason. The knotted quality of literary language, its use of metonymy (the ‘changing of 
names’ which is like a ritual in the compositional process), its apparently natural 
affinity for the dense and allusive, derives from the unknown kernel of trauma which is 
outside the story, yet which shapes it. The hysterical traces in narrative voice are a kind 
of fear. If the author tries to censor the brutal or terrifying notes from his voice then he 




Bakhtin argues for a novel written by multiple characters, not a single objective 
world unified by the author’s voice. The reader does not see a single reality presented 
by the author, but rather, how reality appears to each character. But in my experience 
this does not pertain to narrative voice; it more closely matches point of view in what 
we now call close third person narration. It could also describe a novel like Faulkner’s 
As I Lay Dying  (Faulkner 1964), in which each chapter is a monologue, and in which 
the 59 chapters are narrated by 15 characters. No one would argue that this technique in 
any way diminishes Faulkner’s voice or authorial presence. The characters instantiate 
rather than demonstrate Faulkner's Southern Gothic sensibility. Bakhtin would be 
wrong to suggest that such techniques in any way diminish the author’s ‘power to 
mean’ (Bakhtin 1984, p. 57; 64) 
This view of Dostoevsky’s dialogical principle as superior to the single authorial 
voice is misleading because, as we have seen, there was never a monolithic authorial 
voice, not in Homer nor in the traditions of narrative writing since. As I have said, 
characters, in their ability to shock or surprise the author, have a limited but crucial 
autonomy and agency. Thus, even in a novel with a commanding voice, the characters 
do not exist solely to transmit the author’s ideology. It is also the case that if characters 
spring from hysterical impulses which the author does not fully understand, then they 
cannot represent a single consciousness. In fact, the novel as an art form is perfectly 
suited to ‘play out’ splintered subjectivity. The powerful voice in narration is not, as 
Bakhtin claims, doomed to be flat and monotonous. It might even be said that the 
commanding voice, like the shaman, channels the autonomy of the Other’s voice.  
According to Bakhtin, the dialogical novel is a consciousness lived at the 
borders of other consciousnesses. But even a novel with the most autocratic narrator 




subjects rather than objects. But a novel is not a democracy. A novel with a single 
unified perspective can still contain characters who are ‘unmerged souls’ (Bakhtin 
1984, p. 26). In fact, narrative voice in fiction is precisely a kind of merged soul—an 
alchemical transformation into something mysterious and quite distinct from the 
author’s own social or political voice. The author is not an autocrat in the sense of a 
single unified ideological position. Voice in the literary register is not a single way of 
thinking out loud about life, but strands of language writhing with multiple, 











Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The Teaching of Creative Writing 
 
 
I HAVE COME to feel, unjustly perhaps, that I am not an especially effective teacher of 
creative writing. I wonder whether that perception is accurate. Am I misremembering 
my experience of teaching? Then, recently, I happened to come across an interview with 
an author I’ve never met, who has just published her first novel.  
 
I’ve had a Rod Jones quote (from a 2003 interview with Jane Sullivan) 
pinned above my desk for the past 15 years. It’s about the importance of getting 
lost while you’re writing, that it’s part of the process and you shouldn’t fight it. 
While you need willpower to keep going, especially when you are lost, the 
breakthroughs come “not through will or ego or intellect, but through intuition, 
the accidental glimpses that come when you’re relaxed”. I’ve always found this 
to be true. (Fagan 2018) 
 
For fifteen years, this aspiring writer had my words pinned above her desk. I 
suppose that, too, is a kind of teaching.  
                                                          # 
I was self-taught, and perhaps it is this that informs my scepticism about the 




of afternoons spent in the Rowden White Library, reading interviews with writers in 
The Paris Review. Creative Writing was not taught at The University of Melbourne in 
the 1970s. My guide was Hemingway’s A Moveable Feast (Hemingway 1964), his 
memoir of his early days in Paris where brave fiction could be forged through force of 
will, fierce dedication and purity of purpose.  
In 1976, the year in which I undertook my Diploma of Education, I was 
accepted into Gwyn Dow’s ‘Course B,’ an experimental alternative to standard teacher 
training. Gwyn was a courageous and inspiring teacher, and when I told her I had begun 
to write a novel, she excused me the coursework essays on condition that I show her a 
new chapter of my novel when we met each fortnight. She saw clearly that, although I 
was offically supposed to be a preparing as a teacher, I had really begun to train myself 
as a writer.  
That first novel, as I admitted earlier, was rightly unpublished. After university, 
I worked as a high school teacher of English and History. The idea that one day I might 
become a novelist still seemed impossible. For the next ten years I wrote short stories, 
derivative in style. I spent a year on a Greek island trying to write another novel, 
unfinished. I went back to teaching, still writing, still failing. I was stuck. This unhappy, 
bardo-like state recalls Gramsci’s description in his Prison Notebooks (1992), which 
Fowles used as his epigraph for Daniel Martin: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact 
that the old is dying and new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of 
morbid symptoms appears.’ (cited in Fowles 1977a, p. 3) 
I rose early to write for two hours before I left for work. At school, I was often 
disengaged. There was, however, one exceptional teaching experience. In 1985, I taught 
a Year 12 English elective called ‘The Writer’s Self.’ The reading list included excerpts 




Madame Bovary. The passion I brought to those classes came from the fact that I was 
desperately trying to understand for myself what was involved in becoming a writer.  
Somehow—I don’t know how—my writing developed power. It’s not a matter 
of acquiring cognitive knowledge. Something mysterious happens—an encounter with 
alterity—and you become someone else. The voice, the authority, comes from one’s 
other self on the other side of the portal. It’s as mysterious a transformation as a boy’s 
first ejaculation. ‘How is that (by, from) me?’ asks the Proustian narrator in his insistent 
scrutiny of traces of semen and ink. (Doubrovsky 1986, p. 134) And the mystery of 
what comes out of us as writers continues to haunt us throughout our lives. 
In 1986, my first novel, Julia Paradise, was published and it was successful 
enough to allow me to leave school teaching. I had passed through the portal from 
teaching the writer’s self to living the writer’s self. Ironically, however, part of the 
writing self involved teaching. As a visiting professor at the University of Victoria in 
Canada in 1990, I observed for the first time the dynamics of the workshop method that 
would provide the basis of my own pedagogy in teaching creative writing at various 
universities over the years.  
I found, like many teachers, that some days a class seems to have a magical 
energy and excitement, while other classes fall flat for no apparent reason. I sometimes 
felt the workshop method gave students false hope. I felt the students were most 
engaged when I was speaking from my own experience. When students asked me 
questions about my writing life, I tried to give honest answers, but stressed that these 
things are highly personal and subjective. Insights about writing can seem right one day 
and wrong the next; they cannot be codified into a consistent set of rules.  
I have come to understand that these feelings are not so much about any 




teach writing itself. The discipline of creative writing is so irremediably intertwined 
with the subjectivity of the individual writer that it presents the features or symptoms of 
what Meyer and Land call ‘troublesome knowledge’ (2003, 2005). This opens a range 




Meyer and Land link ‘troublesome knowledge’ to a ‘threshold concept.’ A 
threshold concept is a breakthrough moment, paradigm shift or initiation. A core 
concept in a discipline can be considered epistemological—in that it deals with how 
knowledge comes to be considered as knowledge—whereas threshold concepts have 
features of the ontological, since questions of being include the constitution of the 
subject. As Meyer and Land describe it, ‘A threshold concept can be considered akin to 
a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about 
something. It represents a transformed way of understanding . . . without which the 
learner cannot progress.’ (Meyer 2003, p. 1)  This transformation is ‘protracted over a 
considerable period of time, with the transition to understanding proving troublesome’ 
(Meyer 2003, p. 1) This is because it is accompanied by ‘a shift in the learner’s 
subjectivity, a repositioning of the self’ (Meyer 2005, p. 374). Threshold concepts lead 
to ‘a transfiguration of identity’ (p. 375) because they involve the acquisition of 
knowledge that is ‘alien’ (Meyer 2003, p. 2).  
For the student of creative writing, what precisely is involved in the transition 
from studying the writer’s self to being the writer’s self? What is the state of 
understanding which might constitute what we think of as ‘writer’? And in which ways, 




A key to answering these questions might be found in the realisation that this 
knowledge to be acquired is somehow ‘alien’ (Meyer & Land 2003, p. 9). This radical 
otherness leads directly to the subject’s recognition of the alien within. Hecq writes: 
‘Perhaps we are all, as writers, puzzled from time to time by me-not-me and by me-this-
other distinctions.’ (Hecq 2015, pp. 16-7) I would suggest the condition of being a 
writer is dependant not only on a recognition of these puzzling distinctions but also on 
acquiring the ability repeatedly to enter and return from liminal states associated with 
the self in the manner of a shaman.  
Troublesome knowledge, which involves passing through a ‘portal,’ as Meyer 
and Land describe it, involves a transition to understanding that is ontologically 
transformative, irreversible, integrative and inherently troublesome. It operates through 
questions of identity, liminality, mimicry and pre-liminal variation. It points towards a 
dangerous ‘liminality within learning’ (Meyer 2005, p. 373) and a transformation of the 
subjectivity of the learner in a way that cannot be understood through discipline-specific 
epistemological discourses. This troublesome knowledge can only be acquired by 
undergoing ordeals or ‘resistant difficulties’ (Meyer & Land 2003, p. 3), and the 
struggle to overcome ‘epistemological obstacles’ plunges the student into a liminal 
space where the initiation into the new knowledge also reconstitutes the subject. ‘As a 
result of the ritual the participating individual acquires new knowledge and 
subsequently a new status and identity within the community. This transition however is 
often problematic, troubling, and frequently involves the humbling of the participant.’ 
(Meyer 2005, p. 376)  He or she must strip away, or have stripped from them, the old 
identity. During this period, the individual is ‘naked of self’ (Meyer 2005, p. 376). 
It would be easy to see the acquisition of this kind of new knowledge (as savoir) 




first book. As it would be easy to see the initial humbling as what takes place during the 
trial of writing that first book. However, no matter how conscientious students may be 
in learning core concepts, most students will not be able to break through the liminal 
threshold to the shock of a transformed self. Many students, in fact, do not really want 
to be ‘naked of self’. However, it is only a genuine or authentic transformation of 
identity that coincides with a genuine and authentic transformation of ability, which 
must be contrasted with the mere semblance of threshold-conquering concepts in the 
liminal, those ‘stuck places’ where ‘mimicry’ takes place. Mimicry involves both 
attempts at understanding and troubled misunderstanding, which correspond to a lack of 
authenticity. Mimicry is ‘faking it’ (p. 383). Most students are content to continue with 
mimicry. 
How do we tell if the initiate has passed through the liminal over the threshold 
into being an artist? This initiation ritual might have to be repeated several times before 
the passage from the ‘stuck place’ and from mimicry can pass through the portal to the 
other side, when the writer can discover his or her voice. This might be recognised, as I 
have suggested, through the benchmark of a first publication. However, it should also 
be remembered that the ‘threshold concept’ in creative writing can only be learned 
heuristically so that the personal ordeal or initiation of writing a first novel is not only a 
paradigm shift in the way one comes to think about fiction and its poetics but a 
‘transformation of identity’ (Meyer 2005, p. 374). If creative writing in the university 
involves a transformation of identity, then what exactly are those conceptual gateways 
or ‘portals’, and what is the precise nature of those ‘ordeals’ to be endured and 
overcome?  
However, if we are to enable—it not guarantee—threshold moments of 




within discipline-specific epistemological discourses in the teaching of creative writing? 
Before I go on to attempt to answer this question, it should be noted that the experience 
of the artist is ‘troublesome knowledge’ in that the uncanny, the spooky, and the 
inexplicable experiences encountered in the process of writing a novel go beyond 
discipline-specific epistemological discourses. Any adequate analytic complexity in the 
discipline of creative writing must account for these ontological dimensions. However, 
if we conclude that those irreversible transformations are related to identity 
transformation and therefore ontological, then such knowledge is troublesome in a most 
profound sense. Should it in fact be located outside the ‘safe space’ of learning favoured 
by the contemporary university? Perhaps this is why most creative-writing courses 
focus on technique. 
                                                    #  
 
There is a huge conceptual gap between the teaching of discipline-specific core 
concepts (transferable skills) and the emergence (or not) of a talented artist. Core 
concepts in creative writing (plot, character, dialogue, point of view, etc.) can be taught 
and, although they might improve the student’s language competency, and even make 
their work more readable, they are practically useless in negotiating the initiation, the 
ordeal, the passage through the liminal referred to above.  Although core concepts can 
be taught schematically, the only way to learn ‘troublesome knowledge’ is heuristically, 
which is to say, personally and individually, through ordeal, as threshold concepts are 
often ‘tacit’ (Meyer 2003, p. 9).  Meyer and Land discuss the term art itself (in relation 
to visual arts education) as a threshold concept, and therefore inherently troublesome. 
They quote Hodgkin (2002) in locating art ‘somewhere in the gap that exists between 




Land, 2003, p. 11). I would argue that terms such as ‘talent’, ‘ability’, ‘originality’ and 
‘authenticity’, contested though they might be in the contemporary university, are 
nevertheless also bound up with the specific nature of that ‘troublesomeness’ of art.  
I would also suggest that the strangeness of creativity is also bound up with the 
obsessive focus on the rudiments of technique. As Batuman puts it, technique is more 
teachable than content, but the focus on technique means that graduate fiction writing 
degrees result in good writing but mediocre books. She argues: 
 
Many of the problems in the programme may be viewed as the inevitable 
outcome of technique taken as telos. The raw material hardly seems to matter 
anymore… The fetishisation of technique simultaneously assuages and 
aggravates the anxiety that literature might not be real work. (Batuman 2010, pp. 
3-8) 
 
It also assuages any anxiety about art as threshold knowledge, as I have 
suggested, because the teaching of technique will always fall short of the kind of 
paradigm shifts that Meyer and Land associate with ‘troublesome knowledge,’ because 
it cannot provide a reliable or plausible pathway through the ‘portal’ (Meyer 2005, p. 
374) of becoming a writer. That would involve, like all initiations, a form of ordeal. 
Implicit in such traditions is the assumption that genuine knowledge is experiential, 
something earned through personal qualities like perseverance or courage, with ordeals 
to be passed or failed. Such knowledge is distinct from the kind of cognitive learning 
that takes place in the classroom.  
Of course, even if the troublesome knowledge offered in the creative-writing 




also a ‘stuck space’ of ‘mimicry’ and ‘faking it’ (Meyer & Land 2005, p. 383), this 
might be sufficient to satisfy the submission requirements of the university for a degree. 
However, it is no guarantee that at some future time, posterior to the educational 
framework, the student might move beyond the liminal space and complete the 
initiation ritual by, for example, publishing a first book. 
I suggest that the transformation of ‘becoming an artist’ fits Meyer and Land’s 
criteria of being: (a) transformative (involving a significant shift in the person); (b) 
irreversible (something that cannot then be unlearned); and (c) integrative (revealing 
previously hidden interrelatedness in the experiences of the subject). It strikes me as 





It is also the case that, with each new novel, the writer must go back to the 
liminal space, which is also, for a considerable period of time, the ‘stuck space’ (Meyer 
2005, p. 377). For the experienced writer this is not so much a repetition of initiation 
rites (as there can be only one first novel) as the repeated entry into the liminal space, to 
undergo psychic disintegration and reconstitution as a subject, and in this sense, the 
writer is the shaman of the liminal.  
For me, these ordeals have been associated with periods of mental illness. These 
shamanistic periods of psychic disintegration seem necessary, at least in my own case, 
to the production of each new novel. Thus writing a novel involves such complex 
psychological processes in the writer than it cannot be described as a transferable skill. 




based research,’ which assumes a methodology or even a poetics—as per the language 
of the contemporary university, which attempts to tame the ‘troublesome knowledge’ of 
the writer. It's simply something that happens to you, or not. As Gerald Murnane has 
observed, ‘The work finds us, not we the work’ (cited in Hecq 2015, p. 1).  
The initiation or passing through the portal of becoming an artist coincides with 
the acquisition of experiential knowledge, but that knowledge is not transferable even to 
oneself for the writing of the next novel, or subsequent novels. What writers of literary 
fiction do is spend vast amounts of time re-learning how to write in each new novel. 
The writing of each new novel is something one must approach from scratch, with no 
guarantee of a successful outcome. That learning, or re-learning, is not a rehearsal or a 
remembering but an involuntary repetition, since the experience is like realising 
something for the first time. It is Lacan’s view of psychoanalytic truth as something we 
do not discover for once and for all. We re-find it. We can only ever turn in circles, and 
we find the truth again and again as if we were coming across it for the first time (Lacan 
2018, p. 48). 
This is because what the writer is seeking in writing a novel is not cognitive 
knowledge itself, but the truth of desire. As Lacan says, ‘Psychoanalysis is not 
transmitted like any other knowledge’ (Lacan 2007, p. 6). Nor can the writing of a novel 
be transmitted like any other knowledge. The novel is almost never where the writer 
first thinks he will find it. The first draft conceals more than it reveals. It is the 
equivalent of the ego’s account of the self. The task for the writer through the 
successive drafts is to discover those things the first draft half knew but didn't want to 
know. The manuscript is like the purloined letter: its final draft will be and not be where 




learns or perhaps half-learns. For the subject who writes, desire finds us; we do not ever 




In pedagogical contexts, the discourse on creativity tends to be optimistic. Of 
course, it is in the interests of universities to stress (and to sell) a utopian vision of 
creativity and not to acknowledge its less appealing aspects. However, if negative 
transference is ‘the initial knot of the analytic drama’ (Lacan 1977, pp. 14-5), it is also 
key to the sadistic impulses in writing fiction: the aggression with which flawed 
characters are invented or adapted from experiences as composites, the paranoid 
structure of the novel as teleological, the way plotting mechanisms work to bring the 
reader into relation with precise focus points of authorial hostility. Characters are 
connected with how writers deal with their rage. 
The troublesomeness with threshold concepts in creative writing is that they are 
psychoanalytically inflected, and thus cross from cognitive learning to ontological 
transformations in the student. Making art is more a way of being than a way of 
knowing, even less any way of knowing open to epistemological examination—how do 
you know that which you claim to know? The trouble consists in mistaking the nature 
of the work: overestimating the results teaching core concepts can achieve in mediating 
the subjectivity of the student. How do we disentangle cognitive knowledge from 
ontological transformations in identity and subjectivity? These highly individual and 
subjective aspects of the liminal cannot be replicated in the curriculum. They are life 




Hecq’s distinction between savoir and connaissance (Hecq 2015) would, I think, 
make scholars and university administrators uncomfortable. Savoir is something soaked 
in through experience, the unpredictable ending of a process, whereas connaissance is 
the kind of scholarly knowledge that can be acquired through cognitive learning. 
Ideally, in pedagogy, savoir would be the result of connaissance, but how would the 
university assess whether savoir has been achieved, especially in the arts? Can that 
knowledge be said to exist outside the artwork itself? Which rubric would be 
applicable? Is the creation of each artwork (and the shamanic disintegration of the artist) 
so completely sui generis that any claims of transferable knowledge are specious? Is it 
legitimate to view the creation of an artwork as ‘process’ at all, when the word process 
implies there is something reproducible about it? It is the subject’s need to repeat—
rather than to remember—traces of the traumatic in the self that has perhaps justifiably 
made it so difficult for the university to accept creative writing as a form of scholarly or 
‘practice-led’ research without first having to deny or disguise what it really is.  
When I am composing a story, I am not in any sense an ‘expert in technique’ in 
a way that suggests that writing fiction is somehow the application of learned technique 
to inert material. If we accept Hecq’s idea of savoir, then I am a savant (even an idiot 
savant), knowing the novel I am writing without knowing how I know. The writing is 
intuitive and a poetics of creative writing should respect, without having to account for, 
this kind of trance and this kind of mysticism. The techniques of craft are necessary but 
not sufficient as shamanic rituals.  
Technical knowledge in creative writing is diagnostic, not prescriptive. No 
amount of technical knowledge (connaissance) will enable the (re)crossing into the 
liminal which is necessary for the creation of the new artwork. In this sense, savoir in 




Traces of trauma are present in the writing in an archaeological sense, and the 
sensitivity and precision of one’s ‘touch’—the way the words either feel right or feel 
wrong—are also part of this psychoanalytical inflection.  
Some of the most problematic aspects of creative writing pedagogy involve 
compulsive repetition, negative transference and the death drive. ‘The compulsion to 
repeat, negative transference, and the death drive are important resistances to the cure.’ 
(Hecq 2015, p. 218) I would suggest those are also significant factors in the ways 
novels are made. The practice of fiction indeed might be seen as a ‘resistance to the 
cure.’  
The sinthôme is a workable, productive madness that nevertheless affords the 
subject a kind of integration and agency as a writer. This occurs to a large part through 
repetition. Repetition of a traumatic event may also be a way of achieving a belated 
mastery over it. (Fenichel 1945, p. 542). The compulsion to repeat is evident not just in 
the graphomania of the novelist, or a particular kind of novelist, or in a specific mental 
state, or phase of composition, but also in habits, daily word counts, compulsive 
revision, not to mention the insistent return to mythic roots or repeated themes and 
patterns in the subject matter and its articulation. Such repetitions are always about our 
‘bad internal objects’ (Klein 1975, p. 236), so that each novel is an articulation of the 
constant struggle between an irrepressible urge to destroy as well as to save ourselves, 
to attack our objects and to preserve them. Thus the act of composing the novel involves 
primordial forces struggling with each other as part of its ordeal.  
According to Stoltzfus, discourse is always a discourse of desire, according to 
which the subject needs to repeat (rather than simply remember) the repressed material 
(Stoltzfus 1996, p. 100), so that discourse is always a form of repetition (p.102). 




operations, is also to experience the process by which an affective charge is released 
from its generating poles (Stoltzfus 1996, p. 95). Writing a novel is thus always bound 
up with not only aggressive impulses but also perverse enjoyment (only partly because 
its generative psychic material is always in a sense taboo). Indeed, we might say that the 
writing of novels keeps the writer alive— earns bread, gives him a purpose, defers 
suicide, keeps his Joycean splintered subjectivity sinthômed—such that we might also 
say that this perverse enjoyment comes from wrestling with the death drive. We might 
indeed take a perverse and sadistic pleasure in the sufferings of our characters, but when 
we kill off a character, we also kill off a part of the self.  
If repetition-compulsion (in my experience, an accurate description of the 
process of writing a novel) is seen as a symptom of the death drive, it is nevertheless 
mediated by the play of the pleasure principle (Derrida 1980, p. 286). That repetition-
compulsion can be seen in activities such as the laying out of index cards to structure 
the novel, like someone compulsively playing patience, or in the endless, anxious 
revisions of the sentences, the masochistic enjoyment of the cutting and mutilation that 
shapes the ultimate art work. However, another experience of writing, the spontaneous 
ejaculation of sentences, is enjoyable not because it is deferring the end of the story, but 
because each new unsuspected page that ‘just comes’ like this orgasmically anticipates 
it.  
The path towards death is nothing other than what is called jouissance, as Lacan 
says (Lacan 2007, p. 18). But should we not distinguish between the different kinds of 
jouissance involved in the repetition-compulsion aspects of fiction writing and the 
spontaneous? One can easily see the deathly, addictive feature of constant, neurotic 
revision, but is there not also something deathly in the spontaneous, which at first 




grating/cutting/rubbing of revision and repetition-compulsion moves mechanistically 
towards death (The End) and jouissance is its modality, the apparently distinct pleasure 
of spontaneous composition is also always a repetition (the subject’s need to repeat, 
rather than simply remember), simultaneously moving towards death and leaping back 
from it, or before it, or beyond it.  
The distinguishing feature of literary fiction is the way the language feels on the 
tongue. Because it is the honing of language that is giving us enjoyment, not actual 
cutting of the body, or other addictive injurious behaviour, there is a gap, a playful 
space, that allows a temporary and provisional escape from the mortal fascination of 
jouissance.  
What does the self-cutter dream of in the interval before he returns to self-
mutilation (or masochistic confession) and the pleasurable inscription of pain? If every 
novel we write is a re-enactment of a primary loss, the writing of a first novel was a 
portal leading to engagement with the traces of trauma. Even so, each new novel 
requires a new initiation. The writing of a novel is repeatable, in this sense, but not 
without personal and psychological cost.  
The truth of the symptom in creative writing cannot be read as scholarly 
research (connaissance). For Lacan, educating is doomed to failure. As Hecq argues in 
‘The Impossible Power of Psychoanalysis’, students are conditioning the jouissance of 
academics who produce only a fantasy: the hope that knowledge might produce 
jouissance or truth (in Clemens 2006, p. 221). We are doomed to replay that addiction 
unto death, as we walk those same circuits in the unconscious. This is the sense in 
which novelists repeat ourselves to death: the self who writes is the part of the self that 




As Hecq argues, the university must take into account the subjectivity of the 
writer. This sense of savoir versus connaissance challenges the phantasm of objectivity 
cast up by the discourse of the university and creates epistemological challenges not 
only for creative-writing students but also creative writers working with the university, 
whose writing must pass itself off as ‘research’ and therefore scholarship. The unstable 
subject-who-writes will always pose epistemological challenges for the university for 
the supposed ‘scholar’ or ‘researcher’ is inhabited by the Other. ‘Id is style,’ as Hecq 
points out, and that is precisely why creative writing is a ‘risky business’ (Hecq 2015, p. 
4).  
Feinstein argues for the teachability of craft and compositional aspects of 
language, based on the ignorance of students regarding the fundamentals of language 
and writing: ‘For the most part, students are unaware of what they don’t know about 
their language and how what they don’t know matters in writing.’ (Leahy 2005, p. 192) 
But what about content? Writing students are unaware of what they don’t know about 
themselves, too, and ultimately that’s where content comes from. It has been the 
argument of this final chapter of the exegesis that the individual’s process of 





Apart from the question of whether the best writers make the best writing 
teachers (a largely untested question), we should also ask how writers are ethically and 
professionally positioned to act as ‘the subject supposed to know’ and to guide students 




to mental health. Are writers qualified to perform the function of the analyst? No. Yet 
when we teach, we do perform some of those functions, and what’s more, we 
misrecognise them.  
Hecq discusses the necessary yet dangerous psychoanalytic transference that 
takes place between supervisor and writing student at postgraduate level. The 
‘integration of desire with self is vital to the progress of creative writing students. If the 
supervisor’s role is crucial to this progress, so is the position she adopts’ (Hecq 2009, p. 
3). Transference is triggered by some supposed knowledge. A ‘pedagogy that 
encourages students’ identification with their supervisors . . . enhances the erotic 
dimension of transference’ (Hecq 2009, p. 5). As Hecq rightly asks, what are the 
ontological implications for the student? How can the challenge of transference comply 
with the discourse of the university? (Hecq 2009, p. 4) As Charalambous puts it:  
‘The ethical questions about the teaching of Creative Writing have to do with 
the kind of transaction that takes place between a pedagogy and a writer-
student’s writing fantasy, either enhancing it or exploring and/or troubling it. 
This conception of an ethical transaction has wider implications on art that is 
taught and produced depending on the level of awareness or reflexivity of the 
pedagogue-writer’s desire to write. The imposition of the writer-teacher’s 
desire is a significant element in the teaching of Creative Writing…’ 
(Charalambous 2014) 
Transference, with all its dangers, is the necessary precondition for the student 
(initiate, accolyte, apprentice) to make the great leap into the unknown, and there, in the 
liminal space, perhaps to achieve reconstitution as a subject into a writer. I would argue 




contemporary managerial, vigilant, risk-averse university which has mobilised in order 
to control the carnivalesque culture of the collegium (Land 2006). 
It is not overly Romantic to point out that creative writing thrives on the 
anarchic and rebellious energies of the id. Creative writing is not a ‘safe space.’ 
Creativity is not the utopian, healthful self-expression promoted in university publicity. 
(‘Craft your literary and creative writing skills into a unique talent…’ promises the 
Deakin University MA website). The ‘creative’ draws on the destructive and aggressive 
energies of the id. Any genuine learning that takes place as an artist is fraught with risk. 
Without the student being forced to encounter emotionally charged points in their own 
hostility and desire, they will not find their way to that ‘unique talent’ the university 
promises. Creative writing can be fitted into the university only if creativity is 
understood in technical terms—terms that I argue misrecognise the truth of creativity. If 
our prudent, risk-averse university administrators knew what really happens in those 
rare, challenging masterclasses where genuine learning takes place—the crisis required 
for each creative act, the breakdown in the student’s subjectivity—they would surely 
close down creative writing departments.  
It might also be interesting to examine how the ethics of transference might take 
place in the university of ‘knowledge capitalism’ and neo-managerialist leadership. It 
sets up a clear conflict between ethics and dollars. As Barnett points out, ‘The 
university of the 21st Century is an antagonistic university’ and ‘these antagonisms 
constitute negative dialectics in the university, which diminish the university’ (Barnett 
2016, p. 6). The difficulties and complexities of transference in pedagogy, especially 
when it comes to creative writing, take place within these negative dialectics. 
Gibson, in a review of Vanderslice & Manery’s Can Creative Writing Really Be 




allegedly implicit in the claim that creative writing is beyond teaching (Gibson 2018). 
Gibson’s hostility towards the tall-poppied self might relate to a longstanding jostling 
for power between writers and scholars of literature. Gibson’s use of the word 
charismatic, however, is interesting because it suggests transference, or the workings of 
desire. Of course, academics can be charismatic, sometimes dangerously so, but their 
power derives from the possession of knowledge within the discourse of the university. 
Charisma hints at some other kind of knowledge, perhaps that savoir which is ineffable 
in creative work and artists. Secret-specialised is more problematic as a phrase. Secret 
might relate to that ineffable knowledge just mentioned, something more than mere 
tricks of the trade. It seems to me that the most significant thing in Nabokov’s remark 
that the novel must grow claws and wings is that this happens in secret. (Nabokov 
2008.) There is in this phrase of Gibson’s a Masonic sense of arcane knowledge not 
available to academic enquiry—and a clear sense of resentment about it. Specialised, 
too, is a problem, for does not every discipline have its specialisation? Self takes us into 
subjectivity and its slipperiness, its constant flux through the workings of desire. The 
self, both in its echo of Romanticism and in the problematic psychoanalytic 
composition of the subject, also fuels Gibson’s hostility.  
The act of writing is, of course, intimately bound up with the self, which must be 
acknowledged as highly complex and ambiguous, rather than self-serving. Creative 
writing inevitably involves a ‘doubling’ of the self in that it inscribes traces from those 
authentic parts of the self that must live in exile. This doubling involves far more than 
the wish-fulfilment of daydreams, as Freud might have once suggested. For, as I have 
argued, the protagonist or point-of-view character (indeed, every single character) is an 
alter ego—although I don’t like the Freudian concept ego here. The ego, as the account 




weather system, encased in a fragile cognitive and narrative carapace. But there are 
currents of alterity, existing, for example, as the uncanny in the unconscious, outside the 
ego. As I suggested earlier, it is these which appear unbidden, as uninvited guests in 
character formation, and that can’t really be understood in the same sense as ‘ego’.  
This leads us to another concern operative within a university context—not with 
the ego (or alleged vanity) of the writer, which is Gibson’s problem, but with the ethics 
of the writer. Can the author be criticised for giving expression to these unexamined 
currents of alterity (which even if examined quickly slip back into hiding)? Is the author 
ethically responsible for the flaws in the characters he writes? Of course, in another 
sense, governed by the libidinal economy of the subject and its mechanics of repression, 
we are always put on trial for our dreams. Contemporary controversies in literature, 
however, suggest how easily our dreams can be weaponised against us for ideological 
ends.  
The moment the novel becomes ‘ethical,’ it becomes boring because it expunges 
those currents in alterity that fuel narrative energy. These tendencies in alterity are 
connected of course with authorial hostility—since id is style, as Hecq puts it. However, 
creativity as an anti-utopian impulse is more complex than, say, a hostile novelist’s 
desire for revenge on actual individuals, in that the concept of alterity itself embraces a 
universe that feels deeply hostile and threatening.  
In a sense, novels are revenge, but they are revenge on life, not just on 
individuals in life who might have slighted us or wounded us. The scrutiny of the 
novelist is composed equally of hostility and guilt. The ethics of psychoanalysis 
concerns facilitating the subject’s access to his own desire, and if the pedagogy of 




This will inevitably bring the discipline of creative writing into conflict at every step 
with the discourse (and the authority) of the university.  
‘Only what is useless is pleasurable,’ Giraldi quotes Chekhov. He continues: 
‘The minute literature is for something, yoked to an ideology or cause, hijacked for 
moralising or indoctrination, is the minute it renounces all claims to autonomy, 
relevance, and aesthetic potency.’ (Giraldi 2018, p. 153) In creative writing, if 
everything is ethical, nothing is interesting. In so far as universities wilfully 
misrecognise the troublesome nature of creativity as ‘research,’ they are engaging in a 




‘Once perceived as…the last place a self-respecting artist would want, or be 
welcomed, to ply his trade, the university has…become perhaps the most important 
patron of artistically ambitious literary practice.’  (McGurl 2009, p. 22)  Fenza has 
called university creative writing programs ‘the largest system of literary patronage for 
living writers that the world has ever seen’ (cited in McGurl 2009, p. 24). In 2016, there 
were more than 800 degree-granting creative writing programs in the USA (Leahy 
2016, p. 50),  
But patronage has come at a cost. An inevitable function of the contemporary 
university is surveillance and censorship, subjecting the practice of art to political and 
ethical cleansing. When it comes to the work of creative writers in universities, the 
carnivalesque id of creativity, as I have suggested, has to be dressed up as ‘research.’ 
Creative writing is also often caught in a tense relationship with literary studies, even as 




distinct polarisation between the critical and creative, and this discipline— creative 
writing pedagogy—sits in that divide. One side thinks we aren’t theoretical enough, and 
the other side thinks we’re too theoretical.’ (Leahy 2016, p. 35)   
Hecq (2015), and before her (Atherton 2010), try to defuse what McGurl calls 
the ‘sneering war’ (McGurl 2009, p. 8). Hecq mounts the more sophisticated challenge, 
arguing that creative writing needs its own poetics, highlighting its differences from the 
critical theory of English departments and philosophy (Hecq 2015, p. 12). She focuses 
on ‘the triangulation between practice and theory at the point where it intersects with 
subjectivity’ (p. 47). This is a strong argument for universities to have separate 
departments for creative writing and literary studies. As Krauth explains, ‘English 
Departments in universities, who once made their living out of providing the exegetical 
function—explaining creative writing to the culture—now are more acutely concerned 
with theory/philosophy, which itself needs exegeses’. (Krauth 2002) 
In fact, as I have suggested, it is an argument for why creative writing belongs 
outside the university. In my view, the artist does not belong in the university. The 
kinds of criticisms Barnett (2011, 2012, 2016) makes of the contemporary university, 
bureaucratised to within an inch of its life, or perhaps beyond it (as the ‘ghostly’ 
university), pertain especially to its pernicious effects on artists. Notwithstanding the 
welcome patronage of tenured salaries for creative practitioners, Australian university 
requirements to provide a ‘research statement’ for creative outputs in order for them to 
undergo academic and bureaucratic evaluation, can be seen as an attempt by the 
institution to control and leash artists, and to cleanse them of the last elements of the 
carnivalesque. As Barnett puts it, ‘The knowledge university has dogmatised knowledge 




(Barnett 2011, p. 29) Creativity is not knowledge of this kind, being a threshold 
knowledge.  
Day proposes that ‘We should look outside the English Department and turn to 
studio art departments for further guidance’ (Leahy 2016, p. 41). She cites Bell’s 
argument that ‘The teaching of music and visual art as crafts in some systematic fashion 
is centuries old; it goes back as far as the Renaissance ateliers, even to the medieval 
guilds. There is no long-standing tradition of guilds or ateliers for fiction writers.’ 
(Leahy 2016, p. 41) But the workshop model—democratic, supportive, collegial—is not 
the same as the master’s atelier, where power operates in the way that the master artist 
is ‘the one supposed to know.’ There are plenty of problems with any psychological 
model of mentorship, in that the model always points ahead in the future to the time 
where the apprentice will be ready to break away from the master—or ‘break up’ with 
her or him, as the atelier model is based on transference, with all its attendant ethical, 
emotional and erotic complications. It is also based on power and hierarchy; the 
workshop is too, of course, although it tries to mask it in the trappings of democracy. 
However, artistic talent, or the capability to achieve the threshold knowledge necessary 
to manifesting artistic talent, is not necessarily democratic. ‘For writers, literature is a 
talent show: those with the most talent win.’ (Giraldi 2018, p. 165) 
‘The real university is to be found not in its deep structures, its social 
ontology—its corporatism, its neo-liberalism, its cognitive capitalism, its 
entrepreneurialism and its bureaucratisation—but in its imaginings.’ (Barnett 2016, p. 8) 
But the imaginings of the university must come to terms with the possibility that the 
relation between the pedagogy of creative writing and glimpsing individual 
psychoanalytic truth is an impossible one. If, as Hecq argues, subjectivity is a strength 




be integrated into the managerial systems of surveillance and control of the university 
(Land 2006, p. 104). It is also not clear how the artist and his or her knowledge fits in 
here. The life of art is anxious with troublesome knowledge—elusive, glimpsed, unable 
to be reduced to core concepts in a discipline—and for this reason artists are often 
troublesome for universities.  
 
Are the kinds of knowing involved in talent, authenticity and originality 
themselves the troublesome knowledge? The artist has been seen, historically, as 
déclassé, as an agent of an anarchic energy that challenges convention and kicks against 
the pricks. The leaders who have changed the university, as Land describes it, from the 
carnivalesque collegium of the past to the bland, normative universitas of the present 
(Land 2006, p. 106), who have established the surveillance university that uses 
administration and technology as weapons in its panopticon, are dangerous and 
corrupting patrons of the arts. The writer becomes part of this system of patronage at the 
risk of his integrity.  
My views on the fraught and compromised position of the artist in the modern 
university might appear a cynical way to conclude a PhD thesis written in the 
university. On the contrary, if I emphasise the difficulties of teaching creative writing, if 
I emphasise the contemporary failings of the university when it comes to creative 
writing, it is because I am still an idealist.  
 
 














Amis, M 2008, ‘Interview,’ The Paris Review Interviews, III, Edinburgh: Canon Gate, p. 351-362. 
 
Atherton, C 2010, 'Sleeping with the enemy : creative writing and theory in the academy', AAWP 
2010 : The Strange Bedfellows or Perfect Partners Papers : the refereed proceedings of the 
15th conference of the Australasian Association of Writing Programs, 2010,. 
 
Bakhtin, M 1984, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 
USA. 
 




Barnett, R 2016, Understanding the university : institution, idea, possibilities, Foundations and 
futures of education, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & 
Francis Group, an Informa business, 2016. 
 
Bataille, G 1962, Eroticism, Walker and Co, New York, NY   
 
Batuman, E 2010, 'Get a real degree', London Review of Books, no. 18, p. 3. 
 
Boucher, G 2006, 'Bureaucratic Speech Acts and the University Discourse ', in JaG Clemens, 
Russell, (eds.) (ed.), Jacques Lacan and the other side of psychoanalysis: Reflections on 
Seminar XVII, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, pp. 274-91. 
 
Breton, A & Rosemont, F 1978, What is surrealism? : Selected writings, New York : Monad : 
distributed by Pathfinder Press, 1978. 
 
Charalambous, Z 2014, 'A lacanian study of the effects of creative writing exercises: writing 
fantasies and the constitution of writer subjectivity. ', PhD thesis, UCL Institute of Education. 
 
Clemens, J 2011, 'Annual Colloquium, Lacancircle.net, 2011', retrieved 11 July 2018, 
<www.Lacancircle.net>. 
 
Clemens, JaG, Russell, (eds.) 2006, Jacques Lacan and the other side of psychoanalysis : 
reflections on Seminar XVII, Sic ; 6, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 
 
Conrad, J 1914, The Nigger of the Narcissus, Doubleday, London. 
 
Deleuze, G 2008, Proust and signs, Continuum, London. 
 
Derrida, J 1976, Of grammatology, 1st American ed edn, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore. 
 






Diamond, SA 1996, Anger, madness, and the daimonic : the psychological genesis of violence, 
evil, and creativity, State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y. :. 
 
Doubrovsky, S 1986, Writing and fantasy in Proust. La place de la Madeleine (La Place de la 
Madeleine, écriture et fantasme chez Proust), University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln. 
 
Fagan, M 2018, retrieved 14 July 2019, 
<https://intheirownwrite.wordpress.com/2018/10/19/meet-the-author-melissa-fagan/>. 
 
Faulkner, W 1964, As I lay dying, New edn, Random House, New York,. 
 
Feigenbaum, J 1998, 'How we tell it and how it was', Times Literary Supplement, 30 October 
1998. 
 
Fenichel, O 1945, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, W.W.Norton, New York N.Y. 
 
Flaubert, G & Steegmuller, F 1980, The letters of Gustave Flaubert, Cambridge, Mass. : 
Harvard University Press, 1980-1982. 
 
Fletcher, PC & Frith, C 2009, Perceiving is believing: A Bayesian approach to explaining the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia, vol. 10. 
 
Foucault, M 1966, Le Mots et Les Choses, Gallimard, Paris. 
 
Foucault, M 1989 (1961), Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Fowles, J 1977a, Daniel Martin, Jonathan Cape, London, UK. 
 
Fowles, J 1977b, The Magus: A Revised Version, Jonathan Cape, London. 
 
Freud, S 1896, The aetiology of hysteria, Standard Edition, Vol. 3, Hogarth Press, London. 
 
Freud, S 1905 (1962), Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (trans. James Strachey), Basic 
Books, New York, N.Y. 
 
Freud, S 1908, 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming (1908) ', pp. 141-54. 
 
Freud, S 1913, The Interpretation of Dreams, Macmillan, New York. 
 
Freud, S 1940, An Outline of Psychoanalysis  (trans. James Strachey), Norton, New York. 
 
Freud, S & Breuer, J 1955, Studies on Hysteria, Hogarth Press, London. 
 
Gabbert, E 2018, The Word Pretty, Black Ocean, New York. 
 
Geertz, C 1973, The interpretation of cultures : selected essays, Basic Books, New York. 
 
Gibson, R 2018, 'Review of ’Can Creative Writing Really Be Taught? Resisting Lore in Creative 
Writing Pedagogy’  ', TEXT JOURNAL OF WRITING AND WRITING COURSES, vol. 22, no. 1, 
retrieved 14 July 2019, <http://www.textjournal.com.au/april18/content.htm>. 
 
Giraldi, W 2018, American Audacity: In Defense of Literary Daring, W. W. Norton, New York, 
N.Y. 
 
Gregg, GS 1995, 'Multiple Identities and the Integration of Personality ', Journal of Personality, 





Hecq, D 2009, 'To know or not to know: the uses of transference in PhD supervision', TEXT 
JOURNAL OF WRITING AND WRITING COURSES, no. Special Issue No 6, retrieved 14 July 
2019, <http://www.textjournal.com.au/speciss/issue6/Hecq.pdf>. 
 
Hecq, Da 2015, Towards a poetics of creative writing, New writing viewpoints: 10, Bristol ; 
Buffalo : Multilingual Matters, [2015]. 
 
Hemingway, E 1964, A Moveable Feast, Jonathan Cape, London. 
 
Hermans, HK, Harry 1993, The Dialogical Self: meaning as movement., Academic Press, San 
Diego. 
 
Homer, S 2005, Jacques Lacan, Routledge, London, UK. 
 
James, W 2008, The Varieties of Religious Experience : A Study in Human Nature, The Floating 
Press, [Waiheke Island]. 
 
Jaynes, J 1993, The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind, Penguin 
psychology, Penguin, London. 
 
Jones, R 1986, Julia Paradise, McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, Fitzroy, Vic. 
 
Jones, R 1991, Prince of the lilies, McPhee Gribble, Melbourne. 
 
Jones, R 1995, Billy Sunday, Picador, Sydney. 
 
Jones, R 1997, Nightpictures, Knopf, Milsons Point, N.S.W. 
 
Jones, R 2003, Swan Bay : a novel of destiny, desire and death, Random House Australia, 
Milsons Point, N.S.W. 
 
Jones, R 2015, The mothers, Text Publishing, Melbourne. 
 
Kermode, F 2001, '"Point of View." Rev. of Atonement, by Ian McEwan.', London Review of 
Books, vol. 23.19 pp. 8-9. 
 
Kesel, MD 2009, Eros and ethics : reading Jacques Lacan's Seminar VII, SUNY series, 
insinuations, SUNY Press, Albany. 
 
Krauth, N 2002, 'The Preface as Exegesis', TEXT JOURNAL OF WRITING AND WRITING 
COURSES, vol. 6, no. 1, retrieved 14 July 2019, <www.textjournal.com.au/april02/krauth.htm>. 
 
Lacan, J 1965, '‘Hommage fait à Marguerite Duras’ in  Autres écrits (ed J-A Miller), Paris: Seuil  
2001'. 
 
Lacan, J 1966, Ecrits, Le Champ freudien, Editions du Seuil, Paris. 
 
Lacan, J 1972, 'Le séminaire sur "La Lettre volée" (trans. Jeffrey Mehlman)', Yale French 
Studies, vol. 48, pp. 38-72  
 
Lacan, J 1975, Lacan in America, Nov./Dec. 1975, <www.lacan.com/itinerary.htm>. 
 
Lacan, J 1977, Ecrits: a selection, Routledge, London. 
 
Lacan, J 1992, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Routledge/Norton. 
 
Lacan, J 1999, Seminar XX “Encore”, Norton, New York. 
 
Lacan, J 2007, The other side of psychoanalysis  Seminar XVII, The seminar of Jacques Lacan 





Lacan, J 2018, The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 23, Wiley, Hoboken, N.J. 
 
Lacan, J, Miller, J-A & Porter, D 1992, The ethics of psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan: bk. 7, London : Routledge, 1992. 
 
Land, R 2006, 'Paradigms Lost: academic practice and exteriorising technologies', E-Learning 
and Digital Media, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 100-10. 
 
Leahy, A 2005, Power and Identity in the Creative Writing Classroom, Multilingual Matters, 
Bristol. 
 
Leahy, A 2016, What we talk about when we talk about creative writing, New writing viewpoints: 
14, Multilingual Matters, Bristol. 
 
Loraux, N 1995, The Experiences of Tiresius, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
 
Lysaker, PH 2002, 'Narrative Structure in Psychosis', Theory Psychology, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 
207-20. 
 
McGurl, M 2009, The program era : postwar fiction and the rise of creative writing, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
McNulty, Ta 2015, Wrestling with the angel : experiments in symbolic life, Insurrections, [New 
York] : Columbia University Press, 2015. 
 
Meyer, JaL, R 2003, 'Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge (1)', in C Rust (ed.), 
Improving Student Learning—Ten Years On, OCSLD, Oxford. 
 
Meyer, JaL, R 2005, 'Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge (2): Epistemological 
considerations and a conceptual framework for teaching and learning', Higher Education, vol. 
49, no. 3, pp. 373-88. 
 
Monteiro, G 2000, Fernando Pessoa and nineteenth-century Anglo-American literature, Studies 
in Romance languages, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 
 
Moore, M 1924, Observations, The Dial press, New York,. 
 
Nabokov, VVa 2008, Lolita, Camberwell, Vic. Penguin, 2008. 
 
O'Connor, F 1985, The lonely voice : a study of the short story, 1st Harper colophon edn, 
Harper colophon books, Harper & Row, New York. 
 
Porter, JaB, Mark 2004, 'Before Subjectivity: Lacan and the Classics', Helios, vol. 31, no. 1 & 2. 
 
Pritchett, VS 1966, The living novel, London : Chatto & Windus, 1966. 
New ed. 
 
Prose, F 2002, The lives of the Muses : nine women & the artists they inspired, New York : 
HarperCollins Publishers, c2002. 
1st ed. 
 
Proust, M 1983, Remembrance of Things Past, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England. 
 
Rabaté, J-M, (ed.) 2003, The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Cambridge UK. 
 
Willem de Kooning [videorecording] : artist / a film by Robert Snyder 1995, New York, N.Y. 





Sontag, S 1966, Against interpretation : and other essays, Delta book, New York : Dell 
Publishing Co, 1966. 
 
Spurling, H 1998, The unknown Matisse : a life of Henri Matisse, the early years, 1869-1908, 
New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. 
1st ed. 
 
Stoltzfus, B 1996, Lacan and Literature, SUNY Press, Albany, N.Y. 
 
Ulanov, ABhilgann 2013, Madness and Creativity, Texas A & M University Press, College 
Station :. 
 
Wilson, C 1973, The Strength to Dream: Literature and the Imagination, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, Conn. 
 
Zizek, S 2008, Enjoy Your Symptom!, Routledge, New York, NY. 
 
 
